

University of Alberta

Identity Politics and the Little Guy from Shawinigan

by

Shelley Boulianne



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Department of Sociology

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1999



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-46964-6

Canada

University of Alberta

Library Release Form

Name of Author: Shelley Boulianne


Title of Thesis: Identity Politics and the Little Guy from Shawinigan

Degree: Masters of Arts

Year this Degree Granted: 1999

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly, or scientific purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission




Shelley Boulianne
Box 1867
St. Paul, Alberta
T0A 3A0

August 31, 1999


University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Identity Politics and the Little Guy from Shawinigan" submitted by Shelley J. Boulianne in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts.



Dr. Mike Gillespie



Dr. Sourayan Mookerjee



Dr. Nanci Langford

Date: August 31, 1999

ABSTRACT

Identity politics relates "who am I?" to political positions. A new conception of identity was introduced that stressed the complex, socially constructed, and dynamic nature of identity. This conception was used to study Jean Chrétien's autobiographical construction of identity. His race, gender, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and disability interact in constructing the specificity of his political experiences. However, he does not consider how the privileges of his race, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and gender buffer his experiences of being differently abled. He fosters these identity components' invisibility, camouflaging their importance and relationship to liberal democratic assumptions. These unchallenged assumptions may lead to policy decisions with detrimental effects on gays, disabled people, First Nations people, and women among others who are marginalized within Canadian society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 - Identity Politics and the Little Guy from Shawinigan	1
Chapter 2 - Identity Politics in Enlightenment, Modern, and Postmodern Thoughts	10
Chapter 3 - Identity Politics	19
Chapter 4 - Methodology: Narrative Analysis of Chrétien's Autobiography	31
Chapter 5 - Chrétien's Identity Politics - Part I	45
Chapter 6 - Chrétien Identity Politics - Part II	70
Chapter 7 - Policy Implications of Chrétien's Identity Politics	86
Chapter 8 - Conclusion	97
Endnotes	102
Bibliography	105
Appendix I - Timeline	115
Appendix II- Summary of Autobiography	117

1.0 Identity Politics and the Little Guy from Shawinigan

1.1 Introduction

Identity politics relates "who am I?" to political attitudes and behaviour. To respond to "who am I?" individuals draw on a variety of discursive possibilities. Discussions of gender, race, class, (dis)ability, ethnicity (religion and language), and sexuality offer interpretations of one's political experiences and a sense of who I am. This study explores Prime Minister Chrétien's identity politics. I will examine his autobiographical construction of identity and its relationship to his political positions, such as his views on the Quebec-Canada relationship, First Nations people, gay rights, the needs of differently abled people, and women. The connection between identity and politics for this mainstream political actor has serious policy-making implications and challenges certain assumptions underlying our Canadian liberal democratic state.

1.2 Identity Construction

Identity is a "sense of who I am" (Papanek 1994: 44). This definition does not incorporate the idea of a core, essential, authentic entity, such as the "self". Alternatively, this sense of who I am is called identity, emphasizing the importance of social context. It is shaped (but not determined) by external factors and is diverse in its possibilities for representation. Responses to "who am I?" are continually constructed and reconstructed, as perceptions of our world and place in it change. These constructions are based on a variety of interpretations provided by different discursive communities and adopted (in part) by individuals to explain their experiences. Because identity construction involves developing a theory about one's world and place in it, it provides momentary "coherence" to the world

(Bannerji 1995). In situational responses to "who am I?," individuals may imagine their past, present, and future. In other words, they imagine beyond "being" to "becoming" (see Phelan 1993). This conception of identity is highly dynamic, as needed in any theory of social action (Turner et al 1987).

I define identity in terms of a sense of a common fate to construct identities as forward-looking, i.e., identifying with a future rather than a past. I think that attempts to root identities in historical experiences have been "paralysed" (Guess 1997) by attempts to represent the diversity of experiences. Reflecting on historical experiences is valuable, but for political agency, it is more productive to construct identity as the pursuit of a common future goal. In Bannerji's (1995: 37) words,

identities need to be signs and signals of the future - they must speak to individuals as collectivities of resistance, summoning and interpellating them in their names of resistance, beyond the "house of bondage." As signs they should hold clues to what was and what will be.

Identities need to focus more on the "work to be done" (Tessman 1995: 70). Unfortunately, this forward-looking conception of identity can easily fall into the trap of universalism if we ignore the contradictory political projects contained within any given community. Identity politics is "fraught with contradictory possibilities" (Bannerji 1995: 34).

Identities are constructed and reconstructed through political activity.¹ In other words, "our "given" identities do not simply dictate our politics . . . our identities are themselves formed through our politics, since our political practice is itself an area of (re)habitation or reconstruction of identity" (Tessman 1995: 78). Perceptions of ourselves and our world affect what we dislike and consequently what we attempt to change. Kaufman

and Martin (1994: 100) articulate,

We create political theory and participate in political movements because something seems to be not right with reality as it is. While we may not be able to come to any firm conclusions about the nature of what is wrong with reality, it is this **moment** of discontent that generates critical [i.e., political] activities.

In creating theory or meaning about what is wrong, individuals draw on various discursive possibilities expressed in discussions about race, gender, ethnicity, (dis)ability, sexuality, and class. Individuals draw upon these discourses, reinterpreting them to suit their situation. Because these interpretations are continually reformulated as social context and related experiences change, the sense of one's identity is dynamic. In the Kaufman and Martin quotation, I emphasize "moment" to highlight my position that identities are negotiated, multiple, and reflect the dynamics of a changing social context (Kaufman 1994).

In this sense of who I am, there is a simultaneous recognition of sameness and difference (Bokszanski 1995). Other people are important in identity construction as references for sameness and difference. Previous theories of identity emphasized others as opposite, ignoring sameness which denied opportunities for collaborative political projects. Recognizing both sameness and difference relates identity to a dynamic process. Chrétien's autobiographical construction of identity illustrates this process of recognizing sameness and difference, as he relates to French Canadians, English Canadians, working-class people, and other politicians.

Identity as a recognition of sameness and difference can be developed through a process of naming. In this formulation for identity development, language is used to construct momentary representations of "who am I?" The use of language offers a more

multicultural model of identity development, as specific dialects or vernaculars can be used to represent identity. Language emphasizes the importance of culture as well as social context (time and place). As vocabularies change across the lifespan, identities can be reformulated.²

This model is also valuable for connecting individuals and communities, as the use of similar words may imply an identification. Communities can be imagined as a collection of people who understand not only the meaning of a text, but the words used to construct this meaning (i.e., French words). Language as a "product and possession of an [imagined] community" (Polkinghorne 1988: 23) helps in observing the connection between individuals and a collective. In this study, we can observe Chrétien's connection to the French Canadian community through his use of the French Canadian language and slang as well as cultural narratives identified by this imagined community's discourse. Chrétien is an ideal example of the importance of language in identity construction.

Anderson's (1991) *Imagined Communities* is an influential text in theorizing collective identity. While Anderson similarly recognizes the important of language to identities, he does not explain the relationship in terms of connecting individuals to collectives. Indeed, he seems to focus on collectives ignoring the individuals constituting this community. The value of his conception is its emphasis on the socially constructed nature of identity. He explains that collectives are "imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (6). He similarly rejects the idea of an authentic, core essence that provides the basis for a communion. Others

have followed Anderson's conception, acknowledging the "made up" character of identity (Gamson 1995: 390; also see Goldstein and Rayner 1994). This sense of a "we" is possible, even without face to face interaction with all members of the collective (Lau 1989; Yuval-Davis 1994).

There are many reasons for an individual to choose to identify with a community.³ I connect the motivation for this identification to a means of providing "coherence" to the world, like Bannerji (1995). Many works on identity politics discuss the idea of belonging (i.e., Bannerji 1995; Newitz and Wray 1997; Kaufman 1994). Perhaps there is a greater need for belonging in a "developed industrial societies" (Gitlin 1993: 172) or postmodern world, where there is rejection of the ideals of progress and a fragmentation of collectives (i.e., former Czechoslovakia, USSR and perhaps Canada) resulting in alienation or anomie. These developments may strengthen a need for security and meaning (Stent 1993-1994). By adopting communal meanings of experience, perhaps individuals are satisfying a need for belonging, which can be expressed in language.

In this work, an individual's sense of community is reflected in multiple, intersectional identity components, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, (dis)ability⁴, class, and sexuality.⁵ Other groups could be considered, i.e., family, generation, cohort, etc., and may have explanatory power for the relationship between identity and politics (i.e., Braungart and Braungart (1986) and Stewart (1994)), but I have restricted my selection to those most commonly discussed in identity politics discourse. The proliferation of discourse on these labels' meanings provides individuals with a variety of (perhaps conflicting) sources to draw upon in constructing the meaning of their experiences.

While naming can be empowering, language also hides privileges through "unnamed identities", resulting in a perpetuation of exclusivity or otherness. The idea of formulating identity using language was inspired by Bannerji (1995: 10). She writes,

For me, this process of discovering the many names of my oppression in all its complexity brought sanity. My world became larger and populated. I became a part of a politics which was and continues to be enriched from the same sources, directed by the same vision, resistance and revolution.

In this context, language is connected to empowerment. Her chapter title "The Passion of Naming" also suggests the importance of naming in defining identity. Naming can be empowering, because "as the names proliferate they provide legitimization, informing relations of ruling" (24). Chrétien does not use names in this way. He provides an ideal example of how unnamed identities components can hide from scrutiny, perpetuating exclusivity. However, identifying identity as a combination of class, race, ethnic, gender, sexuality, and (dis)ability experiences exposes these unstated assumptions about identity.

Experiences relate to a particular combination of identity components. Therefore, an experience's meaning reflects these multiple community connections. For example, "women are never just women' - we have a class, a sexuality, an ethnicity, and all these affect our situation and views" (Millen 1997: 7.5). Studies whose conclusions are that one component of identity is more influential than another (i.e., Jackman and Jackman 1983, Srebrnik 1995, Shorten-Gooden and Washington 1996) should be reinterpreted to explore the social context that allows individuals to take-for-granted certain components.⁶ These taken-for-granted components draw unconsciously on a discourse that assumes privileges. Thus, these components are not reflected upon or identified explicitly.

The use of language in identity construction has some limitations. How do those without any recognizable language (babies, mutes, etc.) recognize themselves? In choosing autobiographies as a data source, I am limited to expressions of identity that can be represented by language (Couser 1995). Olshen (1995) points out that although a "sense of self" precedes the acquisition of language, it does not mean that language is not important to maintaining and developing "self". He confirms that while there are limits to expressing "who am I?" using language, language is important to understanding and conceptualizing the transformation of identity. Language is also valuable in the expression of identity, because it portrays the dynamics and social context of identity. As words change in meaning based on social context, the expression and meaning of identities also change. Another issue is the relationship of language to the power dynamics of the community. How can identities develop to challenge the status quo if they are rooted in oppressive words? One option would be to redefine the words, as has been done with "queer" and "white trash" (Gamson 1995; Newitz and Wray 1997).⁷ I believe the merits of this model of identity formulation outweigh its weaknesses: This model is highly appropriate for my method - narrative analysis.

1.3 Outline of this Work

This chapter has introduced the definition of identity politics employed in this study. Chapters two and three provide a greater sense of "what is identity politics?" by tracing the roots of this concept in postmodern, modern, Enlightenment, and liberal thoughts and by reviewing previous works on the subject. From these chapters the readers will gain a sense

of identity politics's history and why it has become a hotly debated topic in academia.

Chapter four describes the methodology involved in this study. Specifically, it reviews the methods employed to investigate the relationship between Chrétien's identity construction communicated in the autobiography and his political positions. Also I examine the issues of authenticity related to this work and its development. I also consider my reasons for choosing Chrétien, which reiterates themes from chapters two and three. Specifically, identity politics has focussed on marginalized people to the point of neglecting the universalism implied by unnamed identities in liberal democratic institutions, which reinforces the status of marginalized people.

Chapters five and six review the findings. Chapter five reviews the plot, titles of his works, his discussion of the Quebec-Canada relationship, as well as the liberal principles of popular governance and Charter rights. Chapter six highlights the taken-for-granted aspects of his identity construction, such as his "(dis)ability," family as well as his relations with "others." Chapter seven explores how Chrétien's identity politics may affect his policies. Specifically, the narratives that he employs to make sense of his experiences may promote assumptions that hinder understanding of others, leading to unfavourable government policies related to First Nations, women, disabled people, and gays. Liberal democratic principle have a substantial affect on how Chrétien interprets his identity and political experiences as well as his policies. Chapter eight will review the implications of the typical identity components of Canadian political actors on policy development in Canada. It will also reflect on the theoretical construction of identity proposed in chapter one. Is Chrétien's identity knowable beyond a moment? How does he relate the process of sameness and

difference in his autobiography?

2.0 Identity Politics in Enlightenment, Modern, and Postmodern Thoughts

Identity politics juxtaposes Enlightenment ideals about rationalism, truth, science, and universal human emancipation. In particular, identity politics emerged in reaction to and as an extension of liberalism, one of several political theories emerging from Enlightenment thought. However, identity politics also relates to postmodernity in its reflection on "difference." Identity politics, like postmodernity according to Ilter et al (1994), expresses differences that were marginalized in modernity. This discussion of identity politics' relationship to the Enlightenment, modernity, and postmodernity reveals the origins of and possibilities for political agency based on identity. It will also assist our understanding of Chrétien's constructed relationship between identity and politics. Specifically, this discussion suggests possible explanations for the findings related to his taken-for-granted components of identity.

Enlightenment thinking, which is the basis of modern thought, considers human nature, science, rationalism, and progress (Harvey 1990). Individuals could reach their maximum potential, because of their employment of science and reason in governance. Truth and reason allow infinite possibilities for society's progress. Rationalism provided for the liberation of humans from the irrationality of religion, myth, superstition, and "the dark side of our own human natures" (Harvey 1990: 12). Employing science, nature (including human nature) could be dominated and manipulated for material gains.

While there are many interpretations of liberalism which have contributed to the formation of liberal democratic principles (see Macpherson 1962), I will focus on the idea that universal human emancipation and progress is achieved through the employment of

rationalism in the development of a governance that protects universal human rights. This strand of thought stresses minimal government interference in the economy and the protection of individuals from government infringement. Additionally, individuals' capacity for reason justified the development of a liberal democracy in which wisdom could be expressed through participation in governance (Digeser 1995). This capacity "promised a kind of politics in which the good of all could be served; politics could be carried out from a position of innocence" (Kaufman and Martin 1994: 86). Digeser (1995: 9) confirms that liberal democracies are

large-scale, industrialized, representative governments found, for the most part in the West. These regimes usually include some form of market economy as well as characteristics of polyarchy: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, availability of alternative sources of information, and the right to form relatively independent associations.

While liberalism is not the only political theory in modernity, it is integral to identity politics in Canada, where democratic institutions are based on many liberal notions. Indeed, popular governance and the protection of individuals' rights and freedoms are common references in Chrétien's identity construction.

Identity politics challenges these liberal democratic ideas, but also builds on them. Identity politics exposes the power relations involved in knowledge production. As such, identity politics is a particularly relevant force in academia. Standards for rational thought are analyzed to illustrate that truth is not a rational construction, but "an effect of the rules of discourse" (Philp 1990: 70). He illustrates that "in modern society the human sciences, through their claims to knowledge and expertise, have transformed these unstable [power]

relations into general patterns of domination" (75). Thus, not only are truth and reason not the basis of an innocent politics, governing decisions have no claim to objective, rational thought.

Identity politics challenges the "universal man" that is the standard for human emancipation. This universal illustrates the interests of particular individuals in society who are ideally represented by liberal democratic institutions. The expression of a universal identity is a political manoeuvre. Bannerji (1995: 51) explains, "Marx speaks of how it benefits a particular class to speak of itself/its interests, etc. as the universal class/interests. It is a way to gaining power and keeping power." Chrétien manifests this claim in presenting himself as a populist. Increasingly it became apparent that western, bourgeois, heterosexual, white, Christian, able-bodied males provided the standards for references to universal human nature and emancipation. Enlightenment thinking reaffirmed and legitimated the dominance of this group. Chrétien reflects this privilege in his narrative.

However, identity politics is not solely the product of critiques of liberalism, it is derivative of the individualism implied by liberal discourse. Particularly, "identity politics is a descendent of western, individualistic ideology" (Gergen 1995: 7). In liberalism, individuals are the focus of theory and practice. The Enlightenment lauded "the pursuit of individual excellence in the name of human progress" (13). Liberation was derived from individual efforts. Digeser (1995: 3) interprets this individualism as a need to "look to our souls and selves in assessing the quality of our politics." In other words, identity should be related to politics, according to individualism and more generally liberalism. This view suggests that identity politics is an extension of liberalism.

However, this relationship between identity and politics has largely been ignored for white, able-bodied, colonialist, bourgeois, Anglophone males' identities, allowing the particularity of interests in liberal democratic institutions to be unchallenged. As a result, liberal democracies have been effective in representing these particular men's identities.

Chambers (1997: 192) discusses how

nonwhites are perceived first and foremost as a function of their group belongingness, that is, as black or Latino or Asian (and then as individuals), [and] whites are perceived first as **individual** people (and secondarily, if at all, as whites). Their essential identity is thus their individual self-identity, to which whiteness as such is a secondary, and so a negligible, factor.
[emphasis added]

Liberalism's focus on individuals constructs whites, specifically heterosexual, able-bodied, Christian, bourgeois, Anglophone, colonialist males, as the ideal social agents. Liberalism has allowed for identity politics, but legitimates it only for a specific group. Macpherson (1962) hints at a similar idea as he reviews the assumptions about identity made by early liberal philosophers, such as Hobbes, Levellers, and Locke. Such assumptions were unquestioned during the development of liberal democratic principles, which explains their invisibility now. As such, the in(di)visibility of whiteness ensures that white people doing what is in effect their own "brand of special-interest politics look like so many individual agents getting on with the business of expression, exploring, negotiating, and even settling their legitimate differences" (197). Democratic institutions are arenas for this brand of politics in which these agents discuss their specific concerns. Again, Chrétien's identity makes similar assumptions.

Following liberalism, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms entrenches rights

and freedoms in the constitution, protecting individuals from government encroachment. These protected freedoms include conscience and religion; thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press; peaceful assembly; and association (Dyke 1993). These freedoms are protected by the judicial system unless the federal or provincial government invokes the notwithstanding clause. The Charter also protects legal liberty and egalitarian rights (Dyke 1993). To the extent that identity politics revolves around Charter rights (as it did at the beginning of the 1980s in Canada) or uses the judicial system to protect its rights, identity politics is an engagement with liberalism and Enlightenment thinking. Gitlin (1993), Gamson (1995), and Gergen (1995) discuss identity politics projects focussed on obtaining rights. On the other hand, identity politics projects also identify the limitations of charter rights on improving the status of communities. To the extent that these projects stress the limitations of the charter, they are rejecting liberalism. Chrétien is a supporter of charter rights, but the limitations of formal rights are neglected in his narrative.

The rational organization of place and space is also modern ideal replicated by the Canadian democratic state. The House of Commons, the more powerful chamber of Parliament, is organized based on the representations of provinces according to their portion of the Canadian population. Provinces are divided into constituencies and each constituency elects a representative. This representative arguably represents the interests of their constituency⁸. When identities of the representative and the constituency are shared, there may be a representation of identities in Ottawa. This possibility has been actualized by "alienated", older, well-educated males (see Harrison et al 1996) and Catholic Francophones living in Quebec, as suggested by the success of the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois. This

organization of space suggests that certain identities, those geographically concentrated, will be represented in the House of Commons. Chrétien's communities are highly concentrated within Canada, which allows for greater possibilities for representation. Communities that are more geographically diverse will not have the same opportunities for representations. Thus, these communities must find alternate methods for representing their identity-based interests in federal politics. A popular response is lobbying, but the legitimacy of this method is under constant scrutiny (see Harrison et al 1996). Such groups are labelled "special interest groups" and targets of the New Right (see Harrison et al 1996). The "rational" organization of Canadian politics based on the management of space has excluded some communities from more legitimate access to power, while helping and hiding others. Some identity politics projects thrive under the Enlightenment's ideal of place and space, while others reject this organization for insufficiently providing for their representation.

Like postmodern thinking, my conception of identity politics challenges the idea that truth is "knowable" (Guess 1997). With identity continually changing, is it ever possible to know yourself beyond the moment of expression? We can never sit comfortably with a sense that we know ourselves, because we are always changing and reformulating our sense of "who am I?". This illustrates a rejection of modernity and an embrace of postmodern ideas which challenge the assumption that the world is knowable. While identity politics rejects postmodernism's hopelessness, it reaffirms challenges to the ideals of truth and knowledge. These issues are central to the use of autobiographies as source about identity. In chapter four, I discuss the "truth" represented by this source and repeat this issues in the conclusion of this work where I address the extent to which Chrétien can know himself and how that

affects the connection of his identity and politics.

Identity politics employs the deconstructed subject of postmodern discourse by acknowledging the interconnectedness of identities and the need to interrogate identities.

Kumar (1995: 135) writes,

The rational, autonomous individual of liberal theory has been dissolved - 'deconstructed' - into a multiplicity of overlapping and mutually inconsistent persons possessing different identities and interests. The rational pursuit of goals by self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals becomes a chimaera. The question, whose or what interest, properly applies, it is claimed, as much to the many headed individual as to the plural society. In these conditions, 'reason' or 'truth' becomes impossible, because unreal, objectives.

The question of "whose politics?" is central to identity politics (also see Siegel 1997). This question recognizes the connection of knowledge to "standpoints" or positions in society through which we know our world (Aronowitz 1992; Smith 1991). The importance of standpoints suggests that grand narratives are not possible. The local or particular is imperative to identity politics. Attention to formal liberal democratic institutions is redirected towards the power relations in everyday experiences. Politics is expressed in local arenas such as in the streets, the home, and the classroom (Gergen 1995). This form of politics affirms that the personal is political and becomes "high-risk activism" as the effects are experienced personally (Taylor and Raeburn 1995). While embracing the idea of "temporary, shifting and local forms of knowledge and experience" (Kumar 1995: 147), the relationship between identity politics and postmodernism suggests these new possibilities and directions for activism.

Postmodernism and identity politics reinforce the socially constructed and historical nature of political identities. Postmodern identities are "are made and re-made in neutral

time" and "no one identity or identity segment is privileged over the other" (147). Communities or groups must be "open" "based among other things, on the 'temporary contract'" (136). We are not bound by these groups. Our membership is strategic and voluntary. In other words, there is no "persistent "we" a trans-historical metaphysical subject . . . [used] to tell stories of progress. The only "we" we need is a local and temporary one" (180).

Identity politics, particularly my conception, maintains a link with modernity as it expresses a possibility for progress. According to my conception, individual and groups are motivated by reflections on "who am I?" to challenge power relations in the hope of improving their fate. Like modernity, my conception emphasizes the future, and thus "becoming" (Harvey 1990). This allowance provides some hope in challenging power structures, instead of "deconstructive paralysis" (Guess 1997). Furthermore, we may pursue goals in hope of progress, but these goals do not have to be rational. This "recognizes the multiple and contradictory outcomes that can result from a variety of political claims, including a deconstructionist approach to politics" (Kaufman and Martin 1994: 98). This discussion offers an explanation for the variety of perspectives on French Canadian identity which coexist with Chrétien's interpretation.

Identity politics has sprung as a critique of many Enlightenment ideals. In particular, it responds to liberalism's assumptions about knowledge and universal standards for human emancipation. We will return to the discussion of liberal democratic principles of popular governance and the need for individuals' protected rights and freedoms when Chrétien employs them in his narrative. Following postmodern thinking and identity politics

discourse, Chrétien is the deconstructed political subject who is rooted in social and historical relations. He maintains some hope of political progress and thus maintains a link, like other identity-based political agents, with modern thoughts.

3.0 Identity Politics

3.1 Introduction: Debating Identity Politics

Identity politics is a constructive development in the challenge to existing power structures. Through identity-based politics, "many formerly silenced and displaced groups [have] emerged from the margins of power and dominant culture to reassert and reclaim supposed identities and experiences" (Giroux 1993: 3). The reclamation and revaluation of their experiences are integral features of their political efforts. Identity politics has challenged universalism, which have contributed to the marginalization of their experiences and identities. It reveals the connection of "who am I?" and political positions.

Critics of identity politics focus on two issues. One is previous constructions of identity politics' paradoxical effects, because of trends that have led to the marginalization of some group members's identities. These previous conceptions of identity politics have had such consequences, but instead of dismissing identity politics, the concept and practice should be reformulated. The second issue relates to the relationship between knowledge, power and identity. Critics disagree that all thoughts have political overtones, requiring writers to relate their identities, making them available for reflection by the readers. Kimmel (1993: 572) writes, "Identity politics have infected all political discourse, so that the characteristics of the speaker often outweigh the content of the speech." This leads to assumptions that all ideas can be reduced to identity, which is "cultural reductionism" (Bannerji 1995). Individuals become mere products of their surroundings, instead of active agents in processing of information. This perspective ignores the dynamic process of identity construction and negotiation that occurs within and among people. These issues clearly

illustrate the need for a reconstruction of identity politics.

3.1 Previous Constructions of Identity Politics

3.1.1 Essentialism

Box 2.1

Definitions of Essentialisms for Women:

Essentialism: refers to the attribution of a fixed essence to women

Biologism: a particular form of essentialism in which women's essence is defined in terms of women's biological capacities

Naturalism: a form of essentialism in which a fixed nature is postulated for women . . . Naturalism may be asserted on theological or on ontological . . . grounds

Universalism: refers to the attributions of invariant social categories, functions, and activities to which all women in all cultures are assigned

Grosz 1994: 84, 85

Previous constructions of identity tend to refer to a fixed essence. This essence can be constructed as universal, natural, biological, and/or ahistorical. These constructions tend to minimize the importance of social context to identities, restricting the identities' dynamics and possibilities. I locate the origins of such conceptions of identity to discourse on the "self". The self is conceived as an authentic, "intrapsychic" entity existing within individual, independent of social context (Zaretsky 1995; Goldstein and Rayner 1994). This essence may be universally shared, natural, and ahistorical. In other words, "everyone has a deep unitary "self" that is relatively stable and unchanging" (Kimmel 1993: 574). Accordingly,

identity is a situational reflection of a unitary, core authentic self (De Munck 1992; Yuval-Davis 1994; Zurcher 1983). Because this self embodies all possibilities for identity, the possibilities of identity are restricted. These theories ignore how identities change with social context. I argue alternatively that the only reference for "who am I?" is a situation-specific identity. Wherever one locates the roots of essentialist conceptions of identity, the results remain as poor constructions of identity in identity politics discourse. These inadequate constructions have fuelled the debate surrounding identity politics and have inherent limitations on the possibilities for identity-based politics.

Arguably essentialism is neither inherently good nor bad (Guess 1997), but in identity politics it has led to overlooking the diversity of historical, socially constructed experiences. By limiting what individuals can be, restrictions are placed on what can be changed. For example, if women were to accept that they are a "natural" category defined by biological capabilities and God-given attributes, then why should they organize for change? There would be no hope of a different, not to mention better, future (Kimmel 1993). Grosz (1994: 85) reiterates that to claim that

women's current social roles and positions are the effects of their essence, nature, biology, or universal social position, these theories are guilty of rendering such roles and positions unalterable and necessary and thus of providing them with a powerful political justification.

Too often in identity politics, the essence of identity has been uncritically described in categorical terms, i.e., race, gender, class, ethnicity, (dis)ability and sexual orientation. How can we use categories of identity without implying that there is an essence connected with them? To begin my response, I stress the importance of providing a critical

examination of these categories and their underlying assumptions, as illustrated by Tessman (1995), Bannerji (1995) and Somers (1994). This critical reflection must include an interrogation of the idea that categories are connected to "ascribed" attributes (Papanek 1994) or primordial entities (Yuval-Davis 1994 and Boyle 1997). Race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, (dis)ability, or class have no meaning except that which is socially constructed. They have little meaning unless they are employed to explain an experience.

Categories are often associated with biologism, universalism and naturalism. In Moghadam's (1994) collection of essays on identity politics and women, there are many examples. The editor introduces the collection of essays by discussing women's unique role in identity politics, because of their reproductive capacity (Moghadam 1994). She is insufficiently critical of "women", as she connects women's experiences of identity politics to an assumed universal biological essence. Papanek (1994) and other contributors are similarly uncritical of the construction of "women," as they depict this identity in biological terms. They consequently ignore and exclude the experiences of women who are not reproductive (whether by choice, age, or biology). Focussing on biology also ignores the unique socially constructed reproductive experiences of women from different classes, sexual orientation, abilities (i.e., disabled) and "others".

Another example is reported in Kimmel's (1993) article dismissing a biological essence for sexual identity and sexuality. He criticizes the use of biologism to promote acceptance of minority sexualities (i.e., "I can't help being gay, it's in my genes"), even as a strategic move. Such constructions ignore the historical and cultural context of identities and reinforce the idea that the individuals asserting this identity need a cure or some form of

treatment (Kimmel 1993). This biological argument excludes lesbians and other sexual minorities who define their sexuality as a choice (see Whisman 1996). Biologically-based constructions ignore the diversity of socially constructed experiences of sexuality and sexual identity, resulting from particular combinations of race, ethnicity, (dis)ability and class.

Helie-Lucas (1994), another contributor to the volume, examines naturalism in essentialist constructions of Muslim identity. She describes how women's roles (and thus, related identities) are constructed by "the word of God" (394). This locates a natural essence to Muslim women. Gergen (1995: 1) provides a different example of naturalism as he discusses identity politics as efforts to obtain "inalienable" rights based on the "natural conditions of its members." Essentialism is derivative of constructions of identities based on nature or spiritualism.

The rejection of biological or natural constructions of categories is insufficient to safeguard against essentialism. Universalism, another form of essentialism, may be committed by attributing a socially constructed an experience to all group members across time and space (Grosz 1994). Grosz (1994) reviews the sexual division of labour as an example. Defining a group by a universal experience excludes those who do not share the experience, but nonetheless imagine themselves as a part of the community. This perpetuates oppression within a community. A universal experience implies an essence to identity that is not easily altered (unchangeable) and undermines the diversity of experiences constructed by particular combinations of identity components.

Universalism is the product of conflating a selection of individuals' experiences as a collective experience, ignoring the negotiation of identities that occurs within individuals

and the diversity of experiences within the group (Gergen 1995). The result is the production of a universal, reflecting those who dominate the group. For example, in Rinehart's (1992) study on gender consciousness, she declares a universally available cognitive model to understand gender consciousness. She claims to separate gender from ethnicity, class, race, sexuality, (dis)ability, and colonial experiences. According to Rinehart, the model is challenged by race, which means that black women do not fit her model. She problematicizes race's distortion of gender experiences instead of acknowledging the whiteness implicit in her model. She points to the "other" without examining the universalized white gender consciousness reflected by her model. To conclude: Somers (1994: 610-611) affirms, "If identities are fixed there can be no room to accommodate changing power relations - or history itself - as they are constituted and reconstituted over time". While neither inherently positive or negative, essentialism is damaging in identity-based politics.

3.1.2 Binary Oppositions and the Obsession with Others

Depicting identities using categories reinforces binary thinking and constructs others as opposite, rather than reflecting on both sameness and difference. People are no longer individuals, "but rather, they become identified as part of a reductionistic category which in turn feeds the dominant stereotype of the oppositional other - male/female, heterosexual/homosexual, white/person of Colour" (Letts and Aujla 1996: 1). To talk about being a woman, white, working class or "other" reinforces binary oppositions that one has to be either one or the other, imposing restrictive boundaries on identity. In other words,

classifying people into "either/or" dichotomies limits their possibilities for diversity (Philp 1990). These binary categories reinforce "other" and difference as opposites, which can reduce opportunities for identification and collaborative political work. Kimmel (1993), Giroux (1993), Guess (1997), and Butler (1990) are similarly concerned about the use of binary categories to locate subjectivities.

The construction of "other" as opposite has further implications. Whites' description of themselves in negative terms has led to justifications for the exploitation of "others". For example, whites, colonialist, bourgeois males define themselves as **not** "savages like aboriginals;" **not** "foolish and emotional like women" and **not** "decadent heathens like "Orientals"" (Newitz and Wray 1997: 172; also see Bannerji 1995). Constructing others as unidimensional (i.e., opposite) is a political statement that further marginalizes and oppresses people. These marginalized people may be forced to respond reactively in their identity construction. Their agency may be obstructed by an "overwhelming preoccupation with what "they say we are" and "what we are not," our "otherization" by "them" [which] precludes much exploration or importance of who we actually are" (Bannerji 1995: 178) and a related politics. Alternatively, "other" could be conceived as both encompassing similarity and difference in references to positions on continua.

The obsession with other reaffirms the invisibility of privileged agents, relegating identity politics to those on the margins of existing power structures. Many locate the origins of identity politics in the politics of marginalized people (Bannerji 1995; Gergen 1995; Giroux 1993; Somers 1994). Marginalized people are seen as "the most active in this quest for an identity and politics based on it" (Bannerji 1995: 28). Marginalized people are not

necessarily the most active in identity politics, they are simply the most visible, because they are the most disruptive. If mainstream actors' identities were more thoroughly explored (as attempted in this study), it "would reveal the actual particularism of their knowledge and political projects" (Bannerji 1995: 20).

Because marginalized peoples' are the focus of identity politics, identity politics is often attributed with embracing and celebrating victimization (Gitlin 1993; Anner 1996; Letts and Aujla 1996), despite arguments of the limitations of this type of identity (Tessman 1995; Anner 1996; Rinehart 1992; Sorisio 1997). Focussing on victimization can encourage passivity, undermining the agency of marginalized people to fight existing power relations. For example, focussing on women's victimization is not empowering as it proliferates "assumptions about universal female goodness and powerlessness, and male evil, [which] are unhelpful in the new moment for they exalt . . . outdated attitudes women need least right now" (Wolf in Siegel 1997: 68). For example, Meznaric (1994) uncritically explores women's victimization in Kosovo. She writes that "women are the special victims of nationalist ideologies and quests for ethnic purity" (76). Rape and the fear of rape of Serbian women by Albanian men is used as a political tool to mark the boundaries between these groups. This perspective focuses on women's victimization, constructing them as passive recipients of identity politics, instead of agents in negotiating their identities and politics. Focussing on victimization constructs this victimization as an essence for women. Women are constructed as inactive objects, diminishing the possibilities for empowerment that are necessary for political agency. Furthermore, discussions about the victims tend to distract from the victimizers' responsibility for their actions (Sorisio 1997). In the case of Kosovo,

the victimizers must be acknowledged as Serbian men, promoting animosity to maintain their patriarchal state.

3.1.3 Oversimplified Conceptions of Identity and Imagined Communities

In identity politics discourse, identity is often oversimplified. Identity is often conceptualized as though gender, race, class, ethnicity, gender, ability, and sexuality are separate components of identity. This reflects the privileges of those who dominate identity-based projects. For example in North American feminism, bourgeois, Anglophone, colonialist, white, able-bodied heterosexual women dominated the movement prior to the 1980s. They constructed their gender as essential to their experiences, ignoring how their whiteness, colonial presence, heterosexuality, language, and class were interwoven with their experiences of gender. They created a universal feminist agent that privileged one component of identity, because this was the only perceived discursive community to explain their experiences. Tessman (1995) acknowledges this:

in popular usage, "identity politics" often refers to a politics that utterly fails to account for more than one supposedly distinct form of oppression at a time. Such formulation would posit one feature of identity as most essential or at least most salient, advocate organization around this one identity, and subordinate other identities. (61)

Many theorists voice similar concerns (Bannerji 1995; Siegel 1997; Somers 1994).

Oversimplified conceptions of identity date back to Marx, as he focussed on class identity and its relationship to politics. Identity has been repeatedly oversimplified in this manner by other theorists. For example, in *Gender Consciousness and Politics*, Rinehart (1992) concentrates on gender. Jackman and Jackman (1983) focus on class. Taylor and

Raeburn (1995), Howard and Patterson (1994), and Gamson (1995) explore sexual orientation in relation to politics. Perkins (1986) claims to concentrate on race by holding gender constant in his analysis of political ambition, ignoring the intersection of class, ethnicity, sexuality, and (dis)ability in creating a diversity of political ambitions within any group. The underlying assumption of these works is that gender, class, race, ethnicity, and (dis)ability can be separated - that they are separate experiences with separate and distinct meanings. These unidimensional or oversimplified definitions are not only limited in their ability to explain the complex relationship between identity and politics, they perpetuate an oppression by constructing imagined communities as homogeneous with an exclusionary universal.

The assumption behind this trend extends beyond the universalizing of a specific group's experiences. It implies that related communities can be identified separately. Bannerji (1995: 12) responds, "My gender, "race" and class are not separated persona or persons - they make and re-present all of me in and to the world that I live in. I am - *always and at once* - there all together for whatever that is worth." She cannot separate her experiences and their interpreted meaning into components. These components as well as those taken-for-granted (sexuality and (dis)ability⁹) interact in experiences and their interpretation. Communities cannot be imagined separately by agents. To construct an "illusion of the distinctiveness of these groups" is to "dismiss or downplay the existence of those whose identities are mixtures - those who are not the norm of the group" (Tessman 1995: 76). All identities are mixtures, but there are power dynamics within groups that result in certain mixtures being portrayed as universal or representative of the group. Emphasizing

this normal mixture results in marginalizing some members' experiences and constructing the collectives as distinct, internally unified, and natural collectives (Tessman 1995; Grosz 1994). When those on the margins are dismissed or ignored, the collectives' borders harden (Gitlin 1993), silencing some members' experiences and reinforcing oppression.

Attempts to posit one identity component as the most detrimental to one's experiences resulted in constructing *ism's* as isolated political battles. This is problematic, because

advocating that separation take place along one line of identity (e.g., gender identity) and that other forms of oppression be fought within the separatist community, one form of oppression is still being privileged and oppressions are therefore being seen as conceptually separable. (Tessman 1995: 61)

Native women cannot abandon their Native community to fight sexism, racism, ablism, capitalism, colonialism, heterosexism, the intolerance of Christianity and the tyranny of Anglophones within feminism. Identities cannot be separated from the communities that sustain them (Tessman 1995). Furthermore, every identity is connected to multiple communities. In the interests of a strong political battle, these political struggles should be combined. Audre Lorde (1995: 537) explains,

My fullest concentration of energy is available to me only when I integrate all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through all my different selves, without the restrictions of externally imposed definition. Only then can I bring myself and my energies as a whole to the service of those struggles which I embrace as part of my living.

Acknowledging the interconnectedness of identity components and communities will lead to possibilities in which my privileges (mitigated through my gender and class) related to being Anglophone, Christian, heterosexual, and white can be employed to end the distribution of privileges to these identities. As such, the fate of various marginalized

communities are linked.

3.1.4 Summary

Previous constructions attempted to define the essence of identity referring to universal, ahistorical, biological or natural definitions. Some conceptions undermine the importance of social context and interaction, consequently limiting the possibilities for agency. Universal constructions lead to the treatment of identity components and related communities as separable, which results in further oppression of some people. In addition, previous constructions did not question the assumption of "other" and difference as opposites which reduces possibilities for activism that accommodates a diversity of identities. By focussing on identity politics as the projects of those on the margins, a victim identity was promoted. This averted attention and criticism from those with privileges, leading to an incomplete challenge to the constructed invisibility and dominance of whiteness, upper classes, Anglophones, Christians, heterosexuals, able-bodied people and males in Canada.

4.0 Methodology: Narrative Analysis of Chrétien's Autobiography

4.1 Introduction

Narratives are stories. They are "strips" of past experience that are "replayed" and "reexperienced" constructing a sense of meaning for an audience (Cortazzi 1993: 39). Life narratives are valuable for investigating the meaning of experiences to a sense of "who am I?". Narrative constructions of identities illustrate community connections and the importance of social context. Narrative analysis can illuminate the process through which political agents construct a sense of "who am I?" and their politics. As such, this method will be used to address the questions: "How does Chrétien use identity to make sense of his politics?" and "How does this construction affect his policy decisions?" In addition to analyzing cultural and linguistics resources drawn upon in constructing identity, I will consider the development of his life story and its authenticity (Reissman 1993). The specificity of his identity construction is illustrated by examining other possible ways of telling the story (see Bruner 1987) and by considering the implications on his policy decisions.

4.2 History and Importance of Life Narratives

Arguably the "self-told life narrative is, by all accounts, ancient and universal" (Bruner 1987: 16) as there are many examples of "the narration of people's historical experience through the voice of charismatic leaders" (Egerton 1994: 6). For instance, life narratives dating back to biblical times symbolize a communities' imagining. The story of Jesus recounted in the new testament expresses a Catholic community. Similarly, Egerton

(1994) discusses the importance of Moses's story to Jewish people. While Chrétien's autobiography similarly involves a narration about imagined communities, this form of narration is fairly recent (Bruner 1987). Many locate its origins in Western culture (Gusdorf 1980; Israel 1994; Smith 1995). Danahay (1993) relates this form's evolution to the development of author-ownership of texts (as opposed to publisher-ownership). He writes, "In autobiography, the ideal of an absolute identification between author and text is given its most forceful expression" (13). The subject of the text and the author are the same person, signifying an association of ownership. Author-ownership (eighteenth century) was complimented in the nineteenth century by a new literate mass to consume these works (Egerton 1994). The rise of democracy further contributed to this forms' development. Couser (1995: 43) writes that "the prestige of authors rose along with democracy and individualism, with the idea that individuals were autonomous beings who could change culture and government to suit their needs." Thus, Chrétien's autobiography is both unique to Western, democratic culture and an ancient form communicating a community's identity.

Autobiographies' popularity are "the most compelling reason for paying critical attention to this pervasive form of popular history" (Egerton 1994: 3). Indeed, this narrative form has grown in popularity to the extent that popular political figures are **expected** to produce such work (Egerton 1994). Their audiences extend far beyond that of academic accounts of history, culture, and political science, making their stories more accessible to the masses (Egerton 1994). This form has consequently a significant role in shaping communities' identities. Political autobiographies can be potent in "shaping the popular, living generational memory of a culture" (349). The importance of Chrétien's autobiography

to shaping communities' identities is suggested by its success in sales (Bothwell 1994). The success and accessibility of this narrative are among the reasons that I analyze this document.

4.3 Narrative Construction

Bruner (1987: 13) describes the construction of autobiographies as an "interpretative feat" achieved through selective memory recall. In constructing a life narrative, the author has ample life experiences from which to choose. They choose experiences and organize them to create a sense of meaning for themselves and their readers. The description and organization of past events in autobiographies suggests the cause of events and their meaning (Egerton 1994). The omission of certain experiences and the elaboration of others are central to the construction of meaning in a narrative and an identity.

The organization of Chrétien's life narrative implies the development of his identity and the events shaping it. His autobiography is arranged in a loose chronological order. He begins with a discussion of his family of origin, which is used to explain his interest and entrance in politics. This proceeds into a review of his cabinet positions, locating him in the fight against Quebec's separation. His last few chapters continue the chronological order by recounting the repatriation of the constitution and the development of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. This discussion unfolds into a portrayal of the 1984 Liberal leadership convention. The 1994 edition continues this temporal organization reviewing his exit from politics and his return as the leader of the Liberal Party and Official Opposition. He concludes this second edition reporting on the 1993 election, which made him Prime Minister of Canada.

Throughout these temporally ordered topics, he inserts stories that are not guided by time but by purpose. For example, at the beginning of chapter two, Chrétien jumps to 1984 narrating an incident that is illustrative of his initial perceptions of the House of Commons. Another example is contained in the third chapter. He begins the chapter portraying his appointment and experiences as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1968-74). However, in the chapter he refers to events occurring in 1979, then 1974 and ends the chapter discussing the October crisis of 1970. His autobiography is not completely chronological, as narratives rarely are (Barros 1998), because it is organized around a specific plot and the provision of supporting evidence (see Appendices I and II).

The loose chronological ordering may reflect "a failure of imagination, a mindless substitute for the difficult quest for the form and meaning of the individual life" (Eakin 1988: 36). However, other political autobiographies written during the 1980s and 1990s reflect a similar ordering, which suggests narrative rules guiding Chrétien's telling of his life story. For example, Lucien Bouchard's (1992) autobiography is also organized beginning with family of origin which leads into a depiction of his political career. Trudeau (1993) clearly organizes his memoirs into time periods. He gives each chapter a time span with a thematic title. Reissman (1993) argues that this ordering is expected of Western autobiographies. While the degree of temporal ordering varies with the autobiographer, there seems to be some structuring of life stories beginning with a description of family of origin and terminating with a more recent defining moment in one's political career. This structure "gives form to the content and the continuity of the life" (Bruner 1987: 23).

4.4 Narrative Analysis of Identities

Narrative analysis of autobiographies involves studying the process through which people give meaning to events and how that reflects a sense "who am I?" at the moment of writing. The representations of identities in narratives are dynamic, socially constructed, and reflect the fate of a community. The process of generating interest and authenticity to the readers are important in this process, as is the consideration of the author's reasons for writing the narrative. These factors affect the content and presentation of a sense of "who am I?"

4.4.1 Autobiographical Identities

Autobiographical identities are dynamic as they depend on social context. Considering the importance of time, space, and relationality undermines essentialist conceptions of self as "the documentary repository of all experiential history" (Smith 1995: 17; also see Somers 1994). Narrative-based identities embed the storyteller within transforming relationships and stories (Somers 1994). Chrétien's identity reflects his experiences with the Duplessis government, his appeal to voters/readers, liberalism and sovereignty discourse. Identities in life narratives recognize that "we are in the middle of our stories and cannot be sure how they will end; we are constantly having to revise the plot as new events are added to our lives" (Polkinghorne 1988: 150). For example, the fate of Chrétien's leadership ambitions is delayed in the 1985 edition with the 1994 edition resolving this ambition. Additionally, identity and meaning are "transformed with each new reading . . . and each new reader" (Barros 1998 :210), constructing autobiographical identities as

dynamic. With each reading, my interpretation of the meaning of his life experiences changes which transform my understanding of his sense of his identity.

As these narratives reflect the author's sense of the past, they also suggest the possibilities for understanding the future (Rosenthal 1997). These stories are building beyond "who am I?" at the moment of writing to who I am becoming (see Polkinghorne 1988). Emphasis is placed on "becoming" instead of a fixed state of being. As such, Chrétien's narrative provides an imagination of his own and his communities' fates. Because communities and their fates can be imagined through such writings, their identities can be constructed (see Perreault 1995). These stories include a normative or moral comment about how things are, were and how they should be (Linde 1986).

In narratives, we can observe community connections or social group identification. Autobiographies illustrate "the various discourses that influence the ways individuals narrativize their own lives" (Steinmetz 1992: 490). When someone has an experience, they are faced with the task of constructing its meaning. Cultural narratives offer possibilities for interpreting the meanings of experiences. Reissman's (1993: 5) asserts that "culture "speaks itself" through an individual's story." Perreault (1995) illustrates this process in her discussion of the various discourses employed by Audre Lorde to give meaning to her experiences in *Cancer Journals*. This process is emulated in the analysis of Chrétien life narrative.

Some theorists argue that cultural norms for narratives are restrictive to the autobiographer. Somers (1994) writes that social actors are not free to construct narratives; they are limited by a "repertoire of available representation and stories" (629). These culture

norms for narratives are used to judge an account's authenticity/truthfulness, which restricts an narrator's possible representations of meaning (see Couser 1995; Personal Narrative Group 1989). They further argue that

eventually the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organize memory, to segment and purpose-build the very "events" of a life. In the end, we *become* the autobiographical narratives by which we "tell about" our lives. (Bruner 1987: 15)

Cultural narratives should not be viewed as static or deterministic. Individuals employ aspects of these narratives, reinterpreting and reconstructing them in the process of giving meaning to their experience.

While, narrative structures may place restrictions on the imagination of alternative meaning, narratives rooted in cultural conventions and language are important to the reader's understanding of the autobiographer (Bruner 1987; Linde 1986). Autobiographies assume an audience "for whom certain discourses of identity and truth make sense" (Smith 1995: 19). While, the employment of some cultural norms is a writers' choice, it may become a necessity if they seek publication.

4.4.2 "Truth"

There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which autobiographical narratives should be treated as "reality" or "truth". This debate is central to the perceived validity of this data source. Somers (1994) argues that social scientists are reluctant to equate narratives with truth, referring to them instead as representations of reality. They do this to distinguish themselves from the humanities. The result is

elevating some kinds of truth-the kinds that conform to established criteria of validity-over others. Generalizations based on these elevated Truths become norms which are rarely challenged for their failure to consider or explain exceptions. This elevation and generalization serve to control: control data, control irregularities of human experiences, and, ultimately, control what constitutes knowledge. (Personal Narratives Group 1989: 262)

This constructs a hierarchy of "truths" (Swindells 1989). Nietzsche explains that there is no such thing as facts, only interpretations that originate with a desire to rule (Antonio 1991). The position designated by my discipline perpetuates the power relations that identity-based politics have sought to disrupt. Treating autobiographies as a second class of "truth" would undermine the agency implied by identity politics. Thus, accounts of identity politics should not be subjected to the standards that they seek to disrupt.

Alternatively, the "truth," if we need to employ this term, of autobiographies is related to the 'real' implications of interpreted experiences on the future. In this study, I am interested in "how participants make sense of what has happened, and how this informs their actions, rather than determining what they did" (Maxwell 1996: 58). I examine how Chrétien's sense of his experiences inform his future policy decisions. Therefore, the accuracy of his account is not as important as how the events are interpreted and used to construct subsequent actions and attitudes.

Ghostwriters disrupt this "truth". Ghostwriters are people who help (to varying degrees) record and narrate a life story. In other words, they are "artistic or literary hacks doing the work for which his [/her] employer takes credit" (Munro 1994: 255). These people may write sections or entire autobiographies (including subjects' thoughts and feelings) and obtain the manuscript's approval by the subject. For example, Munro (1994) reviews his

experiences ghostwriting Diefenbaker and Pearson's autobiographies. When ghostwriter or "collaborators" are used in life-writing, they "disrupt the identity of author, narrator, and subject" (Couser 1995: 46). This trend poses serious validity issues to the "truth" claimed by these autobiographies. On the other hand, Couser (1995: 46) argues that with celebrities' autobiographies, the power dynamic allows some assurance that "authority resides with the subject rather than the author of the text."

However, the work of ghostwriters disrupts the assumption of a relationship between the subject and author of autobiographies. As such, it challenges the relationship between identity and its implication on policy. In the Preface, Chrétien comments on his assistance with the book. Chrétien (1985: 9) wrote the French version "with the help of a close friend as editor and guide," while Graham worked as an editor of the English version. John Rae and Eddie Goldberg were credited with "reviewing the material with me" (10), but the list of readers and editors extends to at least six people. He ends this discussion with an authorial etiquette convention, which reads "the errors and omissions are mine" (10). The discussion does suggest that Chrétien was more involved in the French version than the English. However, my understanding of the texts indicates that the English version is a close translation of the French version. This seems to be a credit to the numerous bilingual reviewers, such as Chrétien's wife. The editions are also similar, except for changes that Chrétien acknowledges were made to the conclusion and introduction. The plot of both editions is similar with a resolution of the tension built in the first edition appearing in the conclusion of the second edition. I have cited the French edition when it more appropriately reflects Chrétien's identity, citing conversations that likely occurred in French or when the

citation only exists in the French edition. Many of the stories were experienced in English and only make sense in this language, which implies the value of the English edition.

Chrétien's use of dialogue generates readers' interest and perceptions about the account's truthfulness. This sense of truthfulness is constructed if the reader expects the conversations to be read and confirmed by the speakers involved. For example, in the French edition, Chrétien recites a conversation with the publisher of Key Porter Books. He writes,

"Madame, lui répondis-je, je n'écirai jamais de livre, car pour écrire un livre, il faut avoir un gros ego, et le mien est assez gros comme ça."

Elle me dit: "Il faut que vous écriviez un livre."

Je lui répondis: "Madame, je n'écirai jamais de livre, car un politicien n'écrit un livre que pour se justifier, et je n'ai rien à justifier devant qui que ce soit.

Elle me dit: "Il faut que vous écriviez un livre."

Je lui répondis: "Madame, je n'écirai jamais de livre."

Elle signa un chèque. Je signai un livre. (1994: 9-10)

This conversation with the Key Porter publisher depicts his initial reluctance to writing an autobiography. However, when the publisher wrote him a cheque, he wrote the book. In this conversation, Chrétien uses dialogue to illustrate his reluctance to write a book about himself. Additionally, it invokes a sense of truthfulness, because the reader might expect that the publisher would have access to this account and could verify its content. Similarly, transcripts of conversations with other politicians, which appear throughout the book, affirm authenticity as they are also identified as consumers of the book. As such, Chrétien persuades readers of his account's authenticity, while providing a situation-specific sense of "Who is Chrétien?"

Dialogue also makes the text more interesting to read. The "performance of replaying" is much more vivid, when others' words are cited (Cortazzi 1993: 40). The

dialogue is informative about the individual, while allowing them to generate the reader's interest in a subject. For example, the first lines of the English edition begins with Chrétien reciting a conversation with an anonymous friend. He uses this conversation to respond to expectations that the text could be "threatening" as well as to explain the development of the idea for this book. This transcription generates interest as well as conveys Chrétien's relations with others.

The conversations also reflect "who is Chrétien?" through his interaction with "others". Andrews (1988: 97) argues that dialogue is important to challenging the idea of "monolithic facts and monologic voice." Specifically, dialogue illustrates power negotiation between the speakers. For example, in the following excerpt, which appears at the end of the volume, we can see the power dynamics between Trudeau and Chrétien in a conversation. Chrétien writes (1985: 220),

Some people have seen a contradiction between my Canadian patriotism and my opposition to Quebec nationalism. At times that has bothered me, too. Once I discussed it with Trudeau. We were walking into the Centre Block of Parliament and as he passed through the revolving doors, I said, "Our position isn't logical, Pierre." He froze. Then he pushed the doors around again and came back out. "What did you say?" he asked. Upon reflection it was apparent that there is no contradiction. I opposed Quebec nationalism because I thought separation would destroy the French fact in North America, not build it up.

This excerpt expresses Chrétien's perspective on Quebec nationalism and Chrétien's subtle deference to Trudeau's intellect, as indicated by the quick justification of his comment. This conversation is one example of Chrétien's illustration that Trudeau challenged him to think, but he was not an empty receptacle for Trudeau's ideas. On another occasion for this reference, he writes, Trudeau "stirred us to try to measure ourselves against his intelligence

and his vision and all the great issues of his time" (1985: 218). It may not be Chrétien's intent to construct a place for others' voices, but he seems to offer room for alternative explanations in this dialogue. In particular, he provides for Trudeau's alternative perspective on the issue.

4.5 Why Chrétien?

I chose to explore a mainstream politician in reaction to existing literature's treatment of identity politics as the activities of those on the margins. This focus hides the agency of mainstream actors. A mainstream actor will illuminate how identity politics works in formal government institutions. Focussing on an elected representative in democratic institutions reveals an interesting dynamic. The elected representative is supposed to represent the identity and concerns of a constituency, not [just] their own construction and interests. Thus, the observation of identity-based politics in such institutions is disruptive of liberal democratic assumptions.

Given my choice of methods, i.e., narrative analysis, I restricted my selection to those politicians who have published narratives of their political life. Chrétien published the 1985 and 1994 editions of his autobiography in English and French.¹⁰ I employ the English edition (1985) and French edition (1994) to describe his sense of his identity. I have chosen Chrétien, because he has held positions that I think are particularly informative for a study of identity-based politics. Specifically, he was the Minister of Northern Development and Indian Affairs for six years, which has resulted in an articulation of his understanding of "others." Comprehending his sense of others is central to studying his identity-based politics

and his policy decisions. As Native Affairs minister and as the current prime minister, he has opportunities to translate his understanding of others into policies. As our current leader, an analysis of how he makes sense of his politics using identity will provide context for his policy decisions.

The popularity of Chrétien's autobiography is another reason for its consideration. In the 1994 edition, Chrétien (1994) reflects on the success of the first edition. He reports the only negative comments were that the book lacked wickedness and that he did not talk about the title of the French edition, "la fosse aux lions". He worried that no one would attend the first book signing, but "d'un bout à l'autre du Canada, de longues files de gens se présentèrent" (11). While some people came to meet a celebrity and others came to add an autograph to their collection, "la plupart étaient venus consacrer de leur temps et de leur argent pour dire merci, tout simplement" (11). In other words, many people attended the book signings to thank him for his work.

He notes that politicians were buying the book, but he was also impressed with the diversity of people who also bought it: "il y avait des jeunes et des vieux, des intellectuels et des ouvriers, des étudiants et des mères de familles" (12). He records an interaction with a reader:

À London, en Ontario, je rencontrai un homme qui m'en fournit l'explication. Comme il portait une cravate rouge vif, je le félicitai, avec mon exubérance habituelle, d'être un libéral. "Je ne suis pas un libéral, monsieur Chrétien, dit-il, mais je suis venu vous demander de continuer d'écrire. Je suis professeur de science politique à l'Université Western Ontario, et à la lecture de votre livre, un tas de choses se sont éclaircies dans mon esprit. Vous avez le don de traduire les questions complexes en termes compréhensibles." (12)

Chrétien's assessment of the book's response reflects his own desire for a recognition of his

political work, which is expressed by "J'espere que vous, lecteur, en lisant cette version mise a jour, pourrez apprecier les satisfactions et les frustrations que je l'ai ressenties au service de ce grand pays" (1994: 13).

The timing of the second edition relates to Chrétien's new position as prime minister. In the Preface, he explains that the publishers requested a new edition. They recognized a new market for the book, because Chrétien's new position may spark interest in a more general audience of Canadians. Readers, such as myself, may be attracted to the work to gain a sense of "Who is this person?" as a possible clue to government's policy directions.

4.6 Summary

In summary, studying Chrétien's autobiography allows a sense of how he constructs the meaning of his political attitudes and behaviours using gender, race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and (dis)ability. I will explore the employment of cultural narratives related to his gender, race, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and (dis)ability in constructing his life story. In particular, I plan to investigate "the incorporation of certain narrative itineraries and intentionalities and the silencing of others" (Smith 1995: 20). The analysis develops into a discussion of liberalism, the narratives' titles, his family, disability, Quebec, Native people as well as "others". I will extract the process of recognizing sameness and difference in relating to "others". Not only will this study add to our understanding of the relationship between identity and politics, it will examine the implications of this relationship on government policies.

5.0 Chrétien's Identity Politics - Part I

5.1 Introduction

As Linde (1986) expects in life narratives, Chrétien suggests how to interpret his work. He begins this task by explaining "I am not trying to settle any old scores or create new ones" (Chrétien 1985: 10). To support his position, he reports in the second edition that readers praised his books' lack of "méchanceté" (Chrétien 1994: 11). Alternatively, he claims to provide "some perspective on the political process in Canada as seen by a close participant" (Chrétien 1985: 19). In contrast, Audrey McLaughlin (1992: xii) reports her life narrative's purpose as "an attempt to describe some of the events and episodes in my life that have led me here and to explain the foundations of my political philosophy." Chrétien does not perceive a similar need to justify the plot of his book. He assumes readers will be unreflective of how the plot differs from his articulated aspiration for the autobiography. The illusion of modesty created by his claim to a "perspective" contrasts sharply with the personal agenda that the plot communicates.

Autobiographies are written for a variety of reasons that affect their content, organization, and constructed meaning. As politicians' autobiographies tend to be stories of their political life, the works may involve any of the following motivations:

- | | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| - image creation | - money |
| - justify political decisions | - catharsis |
| - protect reputations | - describe political relationships |
| - praise one's achievements | - offer advice to successors |
| - reflect and explain one's political career in the context of one's life history | - retaliate against enemies |
| | - attempts to become reelected |

(Ambrose 1994; Barros 1998; Young 1994; McKercher 1994; Egerton 1994).

The urge to write autobiographies seems particularly prevalent during retirement. Ambrose (1994) explains that retired politicians are trying to control perceptions of the past, as they can no longer affect the present. Chrétien's motivation is depicted by the plot, which includes many of the reasons listed above.

Ochberg (1994: 16) defines plot as "a way of organizing events into a rising crescendo of tension that reaches its peak in a climax and then resolves into a denouement." The plot of Chrétien's autobiography is developed by discussions about liberalism, Trudeau, intellectuals, Quebec, and the repatriation of the constitution, as well as reference to his knowledge and abilities related to the political process (see Appendix II). The discussions invoke a tension regarding an expectation about Chrétien's fate. In particular, the narrative is organized around the expected outcome of the Liberal Party leadership campaign and subsequent federal election, which occur in 1984 and are depicted at the end of the narrative. The loose chronological order of the life narrative supports Chrétien's maturation into leadership material.

The tension built by the narrative is not fully resolved in the first edition of the autobiography. Thus, after chapter nine and the Epilogue, the reader remains with a sense that Chrétien's ambitions were obstructed. The second edition, published in 1994, provides a final resolution to Chrétien's frustrated leadership ambitions as he becomes Liberal leader and prime minister of Canada. Bothwell (1994: 129) pronounced Chrétien's (1985) autobiography as a "eulogy", i.e., "a campaign document for struggles dreamt of, but, as yet, unfought." This sentiment appropriately reflects the book's plot, but these struggles are finally resolved in the denouement presented in the second edition.

The argument for Chrétien's leadership merit affects his construction of identity politics. My research question and his implicit character development/plot are tied together. The emphasis and inattention to certain aspects of his identity can be explained by the plot. My analysis of "how does Chrétien makes sense of his politics using identity?" is divided into two chapters. This first chapter explores Chrétien attempt to argue his leadership merit to English and French Canadian readers. In particular, I study the titles of his autobiographical works, his liberal perspective, which includes discussions of his populist image, relationship with Trudeau and intellectuals, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, as well as his position on Quebec-Canada relationship. Each section reflects the plot and Chretien's sense of his identity. The second chapter analyzes the taken-for-granted aspects of his identity and how it relates to his perception of voters/readers at the time of writing. The analysis explores his (dis)ability, his family, and his interaction with First Nations people.

5.2 The Narratives' Titles

The topic of a story should be expressed in the title. The French title, *Dans la fosse aux lions*, seems more reflective of the plot than the English, *Straight From the Heart*. Chrétien does not reflect on the English version's title, but the imagery associated with "straight from the heart" implies the book is not only authentic (truthful and honest) but highly personal, perhaps even emotional. Perhaps this title is a response to suspicions that the book was not written by himself, because he has limited English abilities. Nonetheless, the imagery greatly contrasts with that of the French title, *Dans la fosse aux lions*, which

translates into "in the lion's den". This title implies that the protagonist has struggled in a hostile environment. It communicates a story about tension. In relation to the French version's title, he compares politics to a jungle, locating himself in the lion's den. He explains the comment in relation to democracy and respecting the people's choices. More specifically, the commentary suggests his need to accept the loss of the leadership campaign. While this explanation may have been added to the second edition, it appropriately reflects the frustrated efforts of an ideal leader of the Liberal Party and Canada.

His titles represent the dual audiences that he appeals to in the narrative. Specifically, he is attempting to appeal to English and French Canadians. The English title is non-threatening and subdued to relate to English readers who may be wary of the impact of his French Canadian identity, given the rising nationalism within Quebec. Throughout the narrative, Chrétien presents his experiences with English Canadians in terms of praise and support. The French title, on the other hand, reflects a tension with which French Canadian readers can identify. In particular, it depicts the experiences of being a French Canadian in Ottawa during Quebec's threat of separation. Chrétien constructs a narrative for French and English Canadians to make sense of these experiences. While the content of the narratives are similar, the titles suggest the theme/sentiment on which to focus. This dual appeal affirm his merit as a leader of a "bilingual" country.

5.3 Liberalism

Chrétien embraces some basic liberal democratic principles to enhance his leadership merit. In particular, he commits to two liberal principles, which should be considered for

their implications in his identity construction and policies. He draws on the liberal principles of popular governance and the need for protected rights and freedoms. He constructs a populist image in his recognition of sameness and difference with members of the working class, intellectuals, and Western Canada. This populist image justifies his role in developing a Charter to protect the rights and freedoms of "ordinary" Canadians. The *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* provide Canadians with alternative possibilities for imagining their fate.

5.3.1 Popular Governance

Chrétien presents himself as a populist, in touch with "ordinary people", to argue his leadership qualifications. Chrétien constructs a connection to the working class as evidence for his relationship with ordinary people. This invention illustrates the process through which identity is negotiated between sameness and difference. He acknowledges his sameness and difference in writing "though my family was far from rich, we were seen as successful, almost aristocratic, in the working-class village of La Baie Shawinigan where I grew up. My father worked in the mill, he was the secretary of the municipality" (1985: 20). His wife confirms, "They were very big shots in Shawinigan" (Fulton 1994: 31). On the other hand, he qualifies his class identification with comments such as: "we were hardly poverty-stricken, though the three youngest children shared an allowance of a nickel a day and got the hand-me-downs of the older kids" (1985: 21). Throughout his narrative, he tries to construct a sameness with working class people as an appeal to the populace. For example,

I was a working-class lawyer and I deliberately built my first house in a working-class area, Shawinigan North, while most of the professionals were going to Shawinigan South. My oldest friends are working-class people, though many of them have moved into administration or started businesses, and the president of my riding association has always been a blue-collar worker (22).

He also writes that "my pitch was always to the working class because the Liberal Party in my riding is supported by the unions and workers" (23). His identification with unions and workers stems from their joint efforts to fight Duplessis. He further claims "I know what it was like to be poor" (78) and "I enjoy the company of working people" (113). These comments construct a relationship of sameness with working class people, which affirms his appeal as a leader of "ordinary people." He strategically employs others' perceptions of him to validate this construction. In particular, he explores intellectuals' perceptions. The negotiation and affirmation of his populist identity is exemplified in his relationship to intellectuals. For example, he writes about intellectuals stressing "my humble beginnings" and Trudeau's references to his knowledge of poverty.

Intellectuals' affirmation of his populist identity extends beyond class. Intellectuals criticize the style and language through which he appeals to ordinary people. He writes, "I have always had to pay a political price among the intellectuals of Quebec for using slang, emotion, and jokes in my speeches" (20). He defends his use of slang as common to French Canadians who liked when politicians "did not talk down to them" (128). His speeches included "colourful phrases" and "self-deprecating jokes" (147). This style and language "annoyed the intellectuals who exaggerate my humble beginnings or conclude that I am not educated" (20). This is illustrated in a conversation with Trudeau after Chrétien successfully

negotiated a new constitution with the premiers. Trudeau states, "To think that Lévesque and Morin believe you're not educated enough!" (187). Chrétien responds, "And to think they believe you're *too* educated!" (187). Intellectuals' reactions are included in Chrétien's life narrative to validate his populist image.

Chrétien appeals to ordinary people in response to perceptions of intellectuals' hypocrisy and decreasing political role. Chrétien's identity contrasts with the elitism implied by intellectualism, affirming his popular image. He writes,

the people understood me. They too disliked the double standard of those who behave one way in private and another way in public, like all the socialist professors who know the best restaurants and the best wines and who wear their protest buttons while eating filet mignon. The more I attacked them, the more they insulted me by saying I lacked education and sophistication; but long after I stopped attacking them in my speeches, their insults persisted. (128)

While Chrétien seems to have a similar education to "those intellectuals," he emphasizes his difference from them to appeal to this public sentiment. Their attacks affirm that he is different and an "ordinary person".

To convey his leadership merit, he argues that intellectuals have a diminishing role in politics. He announces,

It is my impression that the intellectuals have less influence in Quebec now than they did in the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps that's partly because I have been in government too long to be impressed by editorials and abstract theories . . . But I trace part of this significant change to the fact that the vast majority of Quebec's intellectuals moved from non-partisan study to support for the separatist option. (128)

Alternatively, Chrétien has an increasing role in politics. While he is not a doctrinaire defender of liberalism, he criticizes Quebec intellectual's embrace of "la passion" over "la

raison" (1994: 135). Chrétien's similar expression of "la passion" instead of reason in his speeches suggests that his comment is not a defense of rationalism, as much as it is to construct a platform for expressing his merit as a leader for French Canadians.

These references to intellectuals include Trudeau. Throughout his book, Chrétien seems to define himself in relation to Trudeau. Chrétien associates himself with Trudeau to illustrate his leadership merit. Specifically, he shares credit for the new Constitution and Charter which are core to Canadian identity. On the other hand, with the decreasing role of Quebec intellectuals and public sentiments about intellectuals' hypocrisy, Chrétien spares no energy to distinguish himself from Trudeau to affirm his populist image and set the stage for his own leadership merit. The emphasis placed on their difference can be explained by the time of the autobiography's writing and the plot. After Trudeau's long term as prime minister, voters were looking for new leadership and Chrétien tried to appeal to them by emphasizing his difference from Trudeau. This sentiment is depicted in 1979, which is the approximate time that Chrétien's leadership ambitions began to develop. He summarizes, "The Liberals had been in power since 1963. People were tired of Trudeau after more than a decade" (1985: 119). Chrétien's emphasis on this working-class identification and a populist identity are part of this attempt to distinguish himself from Trudeau's perception as an elitist. Chrétien exploits this constructed difference in defining his identity and related politics.

Chrétien's identity can be situated in between Trudeau's liberalism and sovereignty discourse. This is observed during the referendum debates when Chrétien expresses frustration towards Claude Ryan's, leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, decision to fight

separation on an "intellectual" basis. He writes that for Ryan

the referendum was an intellectual debate; but while he was winning the arguments, the separatists were winning the hearts of the people. The analysis of his ideas was logical and correct, but it didn't catch an audience like Lévesque's emotional pitches for an independent country, a proud and free people, and a bold and courageous break with the past. (126)

He makes similar complaints about Trudeau. Alternatively, Chrétien prefers to appeal to people's emotion, like Lévesque. Ryan's perspective reflects Trudeau's liberal perspective that people are free, because of their power to reason (Radwanski 1978). To appeal to emotion is to appeal to irrationality and "strike at their freedom" (122). Chrétien, in contrast, employs emotion in his speeches as a reflection of his populist style and in response to separatist discourse. He defends this choice throughout his autobiography against perceived attacks from intellectuals. He does not relate their attacks to a theory of rationalism, but as a personal attack on his lack of education and "humble beginnings" (1985: 20). Chrétien's identity construction should be considered in relation to liberalism and sovereignty discourse. It is rooted in this social context.

Chrétien's reflection on intellectuals and Trudeau avows his populist image. However, his argument does not end here. In another attempt to present himself as a populist, he employs the imagery suggested by "the little guy from Shawinigan" (57). He refers to this label in the autobiography in portraying Albertans' response to him at a party convention. The delegates were expecting the "big ministers" but instead they were sent "this little guy from Shawinigan". The reference serves to construct him as an ordinary, non-threatening person with whom it is easy to identify. In the leadership campaign of 1984, he invokes similar imagery with his reference as "a small-town guy fighting for the ordinary

Canadian" and the "anti-establishment candidate" (211). He employs this "small-town" image again in declaring an identification with Western Canadians. He compares himself to Westerners who are made to feel that they lack "sophistication and culture" (159). He confirms that his rural roots as well as lack of sophistication and culture have "given me an empathy with ordinary people in all regions of the country, even in the West, where French Canadians Liberals aren't exactly worshipped" (159). He further writes that despite his long-time presence in Ottawa, "I never lost the sense that the power establishment looked down upon me because I was from rural Quebec" (158). These comments relate his association with ordinary people, which he exploits in an argument for his merit as a leader of a liberal, democratic country.

5.3.2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

An ideal leader of a liberal, democratic country would not only appeal to ordinary people, but insure their protection from government. These protections are embodied in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, which provides a "symbolic cultural resource on which groups can draw in order to redefine themselves, their social situation, and their possible future" (Seidman 1991: 139). Chrétien's narrative helps Canadians interpret their community using the Charter. At the beginning of his narrative, he captures the liberal sense of the importance of gaining "freedom from" an oppressive state. This is exemplified by his struggles with Duplessis' corrupt government. His depiction of the Duplessis government illustrates the need for citizen's protection from government, but his narrative has deeper roots in French Canadians' imagination. Specifically, he employs aspects of French

Canadian discourse that dates back to the nineteenth century. This discourse is also used by the sovereignty movement.

Harvey (1995) examines the connection between French Canadian identity and civil humanism, which shares principles with liberalism. According to civil humanism, people's virtue must be protected "from the corruption by an alliance of commerce and political power" (81). Farming protected French Canadians' virtue by minimizing their contact with these corrupt forces (Harvey 1995). Chrétien draws on a similar sentiment as he identifies himself as "rural", implying that his virtue was protected from the corrupt forces of Duplessis government. On the other hand, he also defied Duplessis' attempts to keep Quebecers "poor, rural, uneducated" (Chrétien 1985: 13) by obtaining an education, constructing himself as somewhat heroic. Nonetheless, he relates to this cultural narrative, but reinterprets it for his own purposes. He also draws on another aspect of this narrative - the protection of rights and freedoms from government encroachment, which is another means of protecting citizen's virtue.

The American constitution was considered a model of civil humanism for French Canadians (Harvey 1995). Nineteenth-century French Canadian leaders identified with the autonomy constructed from the American constitution's protection of citizens' rights and freedoms from the state. Chrétien similarly stresses the importance of protected rights and freedoms from government infringement, reflecting his experiences with the Duplessis government. He perceives the greatest threat to an individual as government. Chrétien explains that it was difficult to be a Liberal in the 1950s. Because of Duplessis conservatism and corruption, "many students were afraid of losing their government bursaries if they were

seen to be Liberals. That didn't worry me too much, because I had a private scholarship and a summer job in the paper mill" (1985: 12). His privileges protected him from the brunt of Duplessis's corruption, although to reaffirm his appeal as a populist and an ideal leader, he stresses the necessity for protected rights and freedoms. These protected rights and freedoms provide Canadians with a symbol through which they can imagine their fate.

While he shares these aspects of this French Canadian discourse, he rejects other aspects. Specifically, he opposes nineteenth-century French Canadians leaders' admiration of the Americans. He also rejects the American model of republics within a federation, which is reflected in his rejection of greater sovereignty for provinces during the constitutional negotiations. Nonetheless, this is an ideal example of the process through which individuals make sense of their experiences employing some aspects of cultural narratives, reinterpreting them for their purposes, while rejecting others.

Chrétien offers Canadians an imagined community based on the liberal protections accorded by *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Trudeau (1993: 323) expresses a similar perspective, as he writes, "With the Charter in place, we can now say that Canada is a society where all people are equal and where they share some fundamental values based on freedom." Canadians can imagine their fate in terms of equality. Liberal theory professes that protected rights will allow individual's fulfilment to the extent of their ability. They are in control of their thoughts and feelings, free from the oppression of outside sources (Danahay 1993). He shares Trudeau's (1993: 39-40) liberal sentiments: "every human must remain free to shape his own destiny." The assumptions about identity related to liberal thought have serious implications on his policy decisions, as discussed in Chapter 7.

However, his embrace of these liberal principles, i.e., popular governance and protected rights and freedoms, confirm that he would be an ideal leader for Canada. Additionally, the populist image relates his identity construction to his liberal politics.

5.4 Quebec-Canada

The ethnic component of his identity is filtered through the privileges of class, sexuality, (dis)ability, race and gender. He presents his French Canadian identity in a non-threatening manner to aid his appeal as a leader for an English-speaking majority, but he is careful not to alienate French Canadians. This approach is reflected in the titles for his life narrative. In addition to forging a new relationship between French and English Canadians through the new constitution, he responds to the threat of separation, providing a more detailed sense of the French Canadian community. The separatist threat illuminates the importance of social context in developing a sense of "who am I".

Throughout his autobiography, he praises Anglo-dominated institutions for protecting the "French fact in North America" (1985: 13, 220). Following his father's perspective, Chrétien argues that "the survival of the French fact in North America was due to Quebec's association with Canada" (13). When Chrétien entered federal politics in 1963, Ottawa was "a very English town" (25), he emphasizes how it has changed. While he mentions the tension between the English and French parliamentarians, he is careful not to blame the English and stresses how things have changed.

In another example of this dual appeal, he discusses the controversy between French and English Canadians about the monarchy. He identifies himself as "*the* royalist from

Quebec" (191), relating the importance of the monarchy to English Canadian, but is also sensitive to French Canadian's animosity. In his reflection on the song "God Save the Queen," he describes French Canadians' discomfort "with the monarchy, because it has represented the Conquest for many of them" (63). This is illustrative of his attempt to appeal to a dual audience. In a further attempt to reconcile his Anglophone and Francophone voters, he writes that English Canadians have redefined themselves to reflect "the presence in their midst of a large and dynamic francophone population" (152). His narrative tries to appeal to both audiences to forge a relationship with "ordinary people" identifying with either group, which affirms his leadership merit.

He provides proof that he can fit into Anglophone institutions and combine English and French Canadians' support for his leadership. He employs humour, part of his populist style, to communicate this merit to readers. In the first example, he appeals to the English populace through humour which is disarming and perhaps endearing to readers. He writes,

Someone asked me how I had won my riding in spite of the huge Cr ditiste majority of the previous election. I answered falteringly. "Work hard, vary hard," I said. "I went to all the fact-or-ies and I shaked hands with everybody. Sometimes when the work was finish at five o'clock, the man and the woman were passing by so fast that I did not have the time to shake their hand, so I just touched them on the *bras*." Of course I meant "arms." Everyone roared with laughter. "So that's how you won your election, you damn Frenchman!" they said. (27)

He shows that he can respond to his English colleagues and English voters. This example also supports his relationship to working class people. In a similar example, he portrays his association with French Canadians, while showing English Canadians that he is not restricted by this association. He writes,

Another time I was asked about Claude Ryan, then the editor of *Le Devoir*. "Very important," I said. "Every politician read him. He love to be consulted and he give good advice. But he can be a little bit pompous. When you are in the presence of Mr. Ryan, you feel you are in front of a bishop. You almost have to put your knee on the floor and kiss his *bague*." The word "bague" had come into my head instead of "ring". People were laughing so hard that I couldn't continue speaking, but I didn't know what I had said that was so funny. (27)

He includes these examples so that English readers may support him or at least they will not feel threatened by him.

He follows these jokes with the following commentary, which further support his assertion. He admits:

I still have problems in English. There are mistakes that I made at the beginning and I haven't been able to shake them. But many Canadians are very sympathetic. They have followed my progress on television and in speeches over the years and that has given them a rapport with me. "You were pretty bad last year, but you're getting better," they used to say to me on the street and in airports, or "I understood everything you said tonight." I went to a language teacher for a while. She corrected me on my grammar and my pronuhciation mostly. . . One day I asked her to help me with my accent, but she refused. "Never," she said. "When I turn on the radio and you're speaking, I know it's you and the rest of Canada knows it's you. You have to keep it." That's often led me to say that Maurice Chevalier and I had to practise to keep our French accent in English. It has become a kind of trademark. (27-28)

His efforts to fit into Canadian politics centers around learning English. He keeps his accent to maintain his French Canadian identity, but the extent of his identification and praise of English culture are targets of separatists. This excerpt portrays his negotiation of identity, in terms of sameness and difference, to appeal to both English and French Canadians.

In his book, he responds to separatists' accusations that he is a "sell-out" (147) or a "mouthpiece of the anglo establishment" (51). Alternatively, he argues that his speeches

express patriotism, defined as "the love of your own kind" (147), as opposed to nationalism which is "the hatred of others" (147). He emphasizes his love of his kind in his pride about being "Canadien français" and references such as "Canada is the best!" (147). He implies separatism is a nationalist hatred. He continues to discuss their construction of a hierarchy within the community based on "purity" of identity. He writes, "I became angry at the suggestion that there were "pure" and "impure" Quebeckers, depending on their background and mother tongue" (146). Ironically, he employs Parizeau as an example to discredit this racist logic. He explains that Parizeau wife is Polish, does that make his children any less "pure"? This was a missed opportunity to discuss the hierarchy within the French Canadian community based on residence in Quebec, but he does briefly raise the issue of exclusivity in defining community. Furthermore, his commentary portrays the social context in which he is trying to fabricate an identity for himself and the French Canadian community.

His interpretation of his experiences in Quebec provide an opportunity for Quebeckers to imagine their community beyond the Charter. Quebeckers can identify with his experiences with the Church, Duplessis, Lévesque and separation. In chapter one, he relates his politics to his family's anti-clerical perspective. He explains that "ma famille a toujours été rouge, libérale dans la vraie tradition anticléricale des libres penseurs du xix^e siècle" (1994: 15).¹ His depiction of the Quebec of his youth centers around the corruption of the Duplessis government and its close connection with the Roman Catholic Church. Duplessis's patronage and corruption were hidden by nationalist discourse and the Church.

¹ In other words, "my family has always been *rouge*, Liberal in the free-thinking, anti-clerical, anti-establishment tradition of the nineteenth century" (1985: 11).

He explains that Duplessis's

authority was backed by the Roman Catholic Church, which used its position as an arbiter of what was right or wrong for the people to become an instrument of Duplessis. They shared an interest in keeping Quebecers poor, rural, uneducated, and bound to the church teaching that life on earth is just a grim passage to Heaven. Society was based on privileges, not rights; obedience and gratitude were essential parts of the people's mentality. Even as late as 1960 I had a fight with my parish priest, who suggested in his weekly newsletter that we owed our allegiance to the Union Nationale because it had given us a tennis court. It was as scandalous then as in my grandfather's day for a feisty young lawyer to tell a priest to mind his own damn business during an election. Maybe it was more scandalous, as I used to yell at him through a loudspeaker aimed at the church. (1985: 13)

Beyond criticizing the Church's association with Duplessis, Chrétien barely mentions his religion in his life narrative. His opposition to the church can be interpreted as an ideological clash - disagreement about the appropriate relationship between church and state. This interpretation is available for other Quebecers if they share Chrétien's privileges which protected him during his critique of Duplessis and the Church. He does not need the social services offered by the church and thus can afford to alienate its services, but he is conscious of the possible vulnerability of his education, which is controlled by Duplessis and the Church. But he dismisses the concern, because he had a private scholarship and job, which shelter him.

Chrétien is free to define his opposition to the church in terms of ideology, because the church has not excluded or marginalized him in other ways. Specifically, he did not have to deal with the church's teachings about the evils of homosexuality, "white" wash of Christianity, miseducation and abuse of the "savages," or perpetuation of exploitive gender relations. Thus, he can ignore his privileges as a white, middle-class, heterosexual, French

Canadian male. Had his (dis)ability been more pronounced and required the church's social services, the interaction may have been more intense and merited more attention in this autobiography. His identity construction clearly illustrates the effects of these experiences with Duplessis and the Church. He distinguishes himself from this corruption, which constructs him as virtuous leader. He offers a narrative that French Canadians can use to make sense of their experiences with the Church and Duplessis.

His ideological opposition to the Church may have began or consolidated a link to the federal government instead of the provincial government. This identification establishes his merit as a federal leader as well as legitimizes federalist support among French Canadians. Prior to the 1960s, the Church resisted the federal government's attempts to assume responsibility for social welfare (Handler 1988). The Church, along with the Duplessis government, argued that it was protecting French Canadians from the "Anglo-Saxon values" expressed in the federal government's social legislation (Handler 1988). As the Church's influence declined, this agenda was transferred to the provincial government. This transfer is often used to depict the beginning of the Quiet Revolution (Handler 1988). Chrétien's opposition to the Church may have affirmed an identification with the federal government and "Anglo-Saxon values" in opposition to the Quebec provincial government and separatist mentality.

The possibility of Chrétien's identification with Quebec sovereignty was truncated by his first meeting with Lévesque. In 1964, Chrétien met with Lévesque to consider moving to provincial politics. Chrétien explains his temptation in terms of the excitement in Quebec caused by the Quiet Revolution. He reviews his initial motivation for entering federal

politics. This incident involved him attacking the "English" for firing a federal civil servant for advocating sovereignty. He explained his attack by a "belief in defending my own kind" (1985: 34). This reaction caused him concern, because it was based on little knowledge of the situation. This led into an interest in "all of Canada" (34). During his meeting with Lévesque, Lévesque alluded to his advocacy of Quebec's separation. Chrétien asked why he should leave federal politics when he was on his way to a successful future. Lévesque responds,

"Jean, tu n'as aucun avenir à Ottawa, me répondit-il. Dans cinq ans, Ottawa n'existera plus pour nous!" . . .

"Dis-donc, Lévesque, es-tu séparatiste?

- Non, non, je suis fédéraliste . . . Oublie ça, Jean. . ."

Il s'était laissé aller à trop parler; à partir de ce jour, je sus que Lévesque était séparatiste et je tirai mes conclusions sur son honnêteté intellectuelle. Aujourd'hui, en 1985, il prétend qu'il ne l'est plus et cela lui ressemble: il a toujours bien caché son jeu. (1994: 35)"

Lévesque's immediate denial of his intention constructed him and the movement as dishonest, according to Chrétien. His commitment to federal politics affirms his leadership merit and provides a federal connection with which French Canadians can identify.

The encounter inspired Chrétien to fight the dishonesty of the movement's claims. In particular, he decided to focus on fighting separatists' claims that independence would improve their economy. The decision to fight the movement based on this perspective is explained by Chrétien's position when first introduced to the Lévesque's separatist

ii

"Jean, you have no future in Ottawa," Lévesque said, "because in five years Ottawa will not exist for us." I was shocked, because this was the Liberal Minister of National Resources speaking. "But, Lévesque, are you a separatist?" "No, no, I'm a federalist," he said. "Just forget about it Jean." He had said too much." (1985: 32)

perspective (mid 1960s). Beginning in 1965, Chrétien worked with Mitchell Sharp in the Ministry of Finance. The proximity of these experiences shaped Chrétien's responses to separation. He writes:

His education gave me the background to prepare two major speeches on the economic effects of Quebec separation. I knew I would be attacked as the mouthpiece of the anglo establishment, so I deliberately chose four francophones from the Department of Finance . . . to work with me. I wanted to be able to say that my arguments represented the work of five French Canadians and no one else. (1985: 51)

His attack of separation appeals to English and French Canadian readers who are also ambivalent about the movement. Also his perspective on separation confirms his commitment to Canadians, which is necessary for a leader of Canada, but also attests to his ability to respond to the separatist threat.

When Chrétien became the first French Canadian Minister of Finance, economics clearly designated his opposition to separation. In chapter five, Chrétien includes a story about his budget-related interaction with the separatist government of Quebec. In developing the budget in 1978, Chrétien proposed a federally-compensated decrease in provincial sales tax to stimulate consumer demand. After obtaining the (necessarily) discrete approval of all provinces, he declared his intentions and nine of the provinces announced a lowering of taxes. Parizeau, who was Quebec's Minister of Finance, denied any consultation by the federal government and Quebec refused to decrease its provincial sales tax. The result was a "terrible controversy" (105). Chrétien eventually decided to directly mail the expected benefits (\$85) to the Quebec consumers. The Quebec government was enraged and asked Quebecers to forward the money to the provincial treasury. In a public call-in radio show,

a caller criticized Chrétien for his actions, accusing the federal government of interfering in provincial affairs. He responds, "Au fait, madame, qu'avez-vous fait de votre chèque? - Ah je l'ai encaissé! - Ça prouve une chose, chère madame. Votre nationalisme et vos beaux principes ne valent pas 85\$!" (1994: 112)ⁱⁱⁱ. He dismisses the concerns about federal infringement on provincial jurisdiction, by dismissing this woman's concerns as not worth \$85, because she cashed the cheque. His ability to respond to this woman's nationalism supports his capabilities as a leader of Canada.

In his speeches during 1980 referendum campaign, he again argued to Quebecers that separation would not improve the economic lives of ordinary people, but would support bourgeois interest (Trudeau (1968) shares this perspective). He provides a story through which people can imagine an undesirable fate upon separation. Specifically,

Qui sera nommé ambassadeur du Québec après l'indépendance? ... Qui sera assis dans les grosses Cadillac avec chauffeur et "flag sur le hood"? Ce ne sera pas vous, ce ne sera pas moi. Ce ne sera pas les gens ordinaires. Ce sera sûrement les bourgeois de la Grand-Allée à Québec ou d'Outremont à Montréal! Ils auront sûrement du bon temps, mais quel prix devrez-vous payer?" (1994: 134-135)

He observes how the threat of separation has hurt the Quebec economy. He expresses great concern over separatists' claims that sovereignty-association would make Quebecers poorer, but happier, i.e., "Nous serons plus pauvre mais nous serons plus heureux" (214). This argument cannot be diffused by Chrétien's arguments about the economic disadvantages of separation. Nonetheless, he has shown that he can respond to the separatist threat.

iii

"Finally I asked her, "By the way, Madame, what did you do with your cheque?" "Oh, I cashed it," she said. "That proves one thing, Madame," I said. "Your nationalism isn't worth my eighty-five bucks." (1985: 107)

He can also anticipate the direction of the separatist movement, which support his qualifications as a leader. He reports separatists' plans to break away from Canada "étape par étape, petit à petit, jusqu'à ce que plus rien ne relie le Canada" (215). In other words, separatists plan to "sever the links one by one, a little concession here and a little concession there, a move here and a move there, and eventually there will be nothing left" (1985: 151). That was Quebec's position even before the constitutional talks. Chrétien explains, the Quebec government

asked for a new power here and an international presence there, and because each demand looked reasonable and in the best interests of the province, the people went along. In time Quebec would have been independent in all but name and there would be no turning back. (151)

The separatists negotiations have become a "shopping list of demands" (170) with Ottawa as the "grocery store" (Thompson 1998).

Chrétien denounces Mulroney's efforts to negotiate within these parameters. Had he been a wise leader, he would have left the issue untouched. Chrétien is convinced that Quebec would never sign a constitutional agreement. He transcribes a comment by a separatists that confirms this. He writes, "Jean . . . you know we are separatists. So how can we sign a new confederation?" (1985: 174). On the other hand, he shares a disappointment that Quebec did not sign the constitutional agreement, validating their concerns about cultural survival. He narrates:

He [Lévesque] claimed he couldn't accept the deal because of three problems. "Okay," Trudeau said, "let's see if we can solve them." But Quebec wasn't willing to sign anything. Finally Trudeau said, "If you don't want to sign, we will finish the work among ourselves." It was one of the saddest moments in my career to see Quebec so isolated, particularly when Lévesque asked, "Won't you please give me back my right of veto?" Personally I felt that was

a proper request, not for Quebec as a province but for a minority population with unique concerns in linguistic and cultural matters, but it was too late. (187-188)

Not only does this excerpt express a disappointment with which Québeckers can identify, it illustrates the ambiguity of Chrétien's position on "special status". While he rejects the requests associated with Quebec's claim to "special status," he recognizes the uniqueness of Quebec. In a speech, he said, "Those who are in favour of special status are often separatists who don't want to admit that they are separatists" (55). On the other hand, he believes Quebec's uniqueness should be represented by an option to veto constitutional amendments. Chrétien states, "I had always refused to sacrifice Quebec's veto, even at the cost of alienating other provinces, because I felt it was important as a safeguard and a symbol for Quebeckers" (179). The distinction between special status and uniqueness is ambiguous. This constructs Chrétien's position as similar ambiguous (Thompson 1998). However, this ambiguity is exploited to not offend French Canadians.

To further console French Canadians' concerns about cultural survival, he reassures them with a narrative affirming their survival if they commit to Canada. His begins by relating his father's experiences of briefly living in the United States among French Canadians who migrated from Canada and eventually lost their culture. Chrétien (1985: 14) explains, "The assimilation and loss of influence of the French in the United States contrasted dramatically with what had happened in Canada, so my father always looked on Canada as a good protector." He acknowledges separatists' emphasis on the conquest to encourage animosity towards the Canadian state. He admits that

Depuis que leurs ancêtres perdirent la bataille des Plaines d'Abraham à la

suite d'une attaque nocturne des Anglais, les Québécois ont toujours voulu réécrire l'histoire. Pendant la campagne du *Non*, j'amusais mes auditoires en leur disant: "Moi, aussi, j'aurais aimé être là pour réveiller Montcalm et lui dire que les Anglais s'en venaient. Mais je n'étais pas là!" C'était ma manière à moi de faire comprendre qu'il fallait accepter la réalité. (1994: 135)^{iv}

His construction of French Canadian identity reflects a focus on the future of a community, not its past. This is articulated in the English version: "Like my father, I prefer to downplay the wrongs of the past and concentrate on the hopes for the future" (1985: 148). In contrast, the Preamble to the referendum question reads:

The conquest of 1760 did not break the determination of their descendants to remain faithful to a destiny unique in North America. Already in 1774, through the Quebec Act, the conqueror recognized the distinct nature of their institutions. Neither attempt at assimilation nor the Act of Union of 1840 could break their endurance. ("We the People of Quebec" 1995: A1)

To respond to this sentiment of conquest, Chrétien stresses Quebeckers role in beating the English and American armies who invaded Lower Canada. French Canadians also helped settle the West. Chrétien's narrative responds to the content of sovereignty discourse, which is exemplified by Quebec license plates stating, "Je me souviens", while asserting a forward-looking identity for French Canadians.

5.5 Summary

Chrétien makes a specific appeal to Quebeckers to affirm the desirability of his

iv

"Quebeckers have wanted to rewrite history ever since their ancestors lost the tiny battle on the Plains of Abraham because the English troops crept up on them in the night. "I too, wish I had been able to wake up Montcalm and tell him the English were coming," I used to say in my speeches, "but I was not there." The audiences laughed, but it was my way of making the serious point that we had to face reality" (1985: 145).

leadership and to respond to sovereignty discourse. His liberalism appeals to both French and English Canadians by protecting their rights and freedoms as well as emphasizing the populace's role in governing through his populist mentality. The appeal illustrates the dynamics in the relationship between Chrétien's identity and social context, while developing the plot. He exemplifies his dual appeals through the titles of his works. While the recognition of sameness and difference in constructing identity is apparent in this chapter, the discussion of his (dis)ability, family, and First Nations people challenges his construction as a populist, as he expresses the privileges of his identity and perpetuates the exclusion of "others" from Canadian politics.

6.0 Chrétien's Identity Politics - Part II

6.1 Introduction

In this second part, the liberal assumptions and privileges invoked in Chrétien's identity construction become more apparent. His "(dis)ability", family, and relationship with "others" illustrate the power inequities separating him from "ordinary people." While he still maintains a populist image, the hypocrisies and oversights of this construction are much more explicit in the following discussion. The analysis leads into Chapter 7 which explores the impact of his privileged identity construction on policy-making.

6.2 (Dis)ability

In Chapter one, readers are introduced to Chrétien's "disability," which illustrate the bodily experience of his identity. Reviewing his childhood academic struggles, he writes about his shyness about a

birth defect that had left me deaf in my right ear and distorted my mouth, although I had become quite good at defending myself with my fists after years of hanging out in the neighbourhood poolroom, which could become pretty lively on payday or during a political campaign. (1985: 21-22)¹¹

In chapter 11 of the French edition, Chrétien also mentions this "disability" during his portrayal of the 1993 election. He refers to a controversial Conservative campaign commercial that emphasized his distorted mouth, with a voice-over saying that it would be embarrassing to have this person as prime minister of Canada. He writes,

Rien n'a nui davantage au Parti conservateur que leurs annonces télévisée destinées à me nuire. Dès mon enfance, j'avais eu à affronter les blagues des autres à propos de mon handicap physique. "J'ai peut-être la bouche tordue, plaisantais-je, mais au moins, je n'ai pas l'esprit tordu comme vous autres."

Pendant toute ma vie politique, j'avais également subi des insultes exagérées à propos de mon anglais ou de mon français⁴. Alors, un matin, . . . lorsque j'entendis parler, en me réveillant, des affreuses annonces qui avaient été diffusées la veille, je savais qu'ils s'agissait de ma bouche. (1994: 227-228)

Chrétien's reacted dismissively to this commercial. Indeed, he believes that the commercials may have inadvertently helped him by showing the desperation and "l'esprit tordu" (wicked spirit) of the Conservatives.

Throughout his autobiography, he underplays the effects of this body characteristic on his life. Russo (1989: A7) states that "growing up with these disabilities would surely have had a profound psychological impact on Chrétien." Because of his treatment of this identity component, I find it problematic to label or associate him with "disabled". Had this "difference" not been described in this book or an issue in the 1993 election campaign, I would have not hesitated in depicting Chrétien's identity as an **able-bodied**, white, heterosexual, French Canadian, Catholic man, as he tends to construct his identity.

Alternatively, the role of others and the interconnectedness of identities are exemplified by this discussion. Specifically, others' perceptions about Chrétien's sameness and difference are identifiable. While he denies his difference, the Conservatives' commercial and his childhood comrades stress his difference. In the end, they are unable to persuade Chrétien to alter his sense of "who am I?" as presented by this autobiography. Chrétien's power related to other aspects of his identity shelter him from the effects of others' perceptions. His efforts have passed him off as the "same" to the point of perhaps impairing his understanding of the impact of "difference". This is supported by his relationship with his adopted son, First Nations people, and "others" within Canadian society.

His privileges suppress an opportunity to implement alternative narratives to depict the meaning of these experiences, which allows his liberal assumptions to remain unchallenged. He may minimize his (dis)ability, because it may jeopardize or at least it does not support his leadership qualifications. Liberalism professes that once individuals are protected from government infringement, their fulfillment is only limited by their own ability. He downplays any questions about his ability to perhaps prevent questions about his leadership merit. His underemphasis on this altered ability denies the impact of others's perceptions and a reflection on the privileges needed to enact this potential. This raises important policy implications.

6.3 The Personal is Indeed Political: Politics and Family

The tendency to restrict the discussion of his family in this autobiography reflects an attempt to separate these dimensions. The attempt has specific political ramifications. He avoids discussing his family, partly because its existence provides little support for his candidacy. McLaughlin (1992) asserts the incompatibility of public life and family. The difficulty is exemplified by Brown (1989) who reflects on the struggles to balance family and politics in her life narrative. Many families, such as Sheila Copps and Pierre Elliott Trudeau's, have succumbed to the stress of public life. Chrétien's family similarly experiences trouble, but he seems unaffected by it (or at least presents himself as such). In this sense, his identity embodies privileges that allow him to deny that his family is a liability and to maintain their privacy. Secondary accounts about his wife Aline and son Michel portray the muted aspects of Chrétien's identity.

The book's dedication to his wife is one of few references to his family. He writes in the Preface,

Of all the people who have stood by me, none has been more faithful than my wife Aline. Certainly her judgement helped to shape this book. It is to her that I dedicate it, in appreciation of her great support and love throughout the years. (1985: 10)

This dedication is not atypical, as many political autobiographers show their appreciation to their family by dedicating their work to them. Trudeau (1993) dedicates his *Memoirs* to his parents. Bouchard (1992) identifies his parents, children, and wife in his dedication. Among others, Campbell (1996) also dedicates her memoirs to her family. Chrétien's reference to his wife in the dedication is not particularly informative about his particular identity. On the other hand, his presentation of family primarily through pictures suggests that while he has their support, he is unrestricted by their presence.

Pictures of his family and occasional references to his wife implicitly affirm Chrétien's heterosexuality, which confirms his appropriateness as a representative of a (largely) homophobic Canadian population. Not emphasizing this heterosexuality suggests its taken-for-granted dominance in Canadian society. If he was gay and had a different combination of identity components, he may have more thoroughly or explicitly explored its effects on his politics. Because he does not make explicit references to it, I expect that he is unaware of narratives communicating the relationship between sexuality and politics, as expressed by Gamson (1995) among others. Alternatively, the provision of "proof" for his heterosexuality may respond to the residual anxiety about other leaders' ambiguous sexuality (i.e., Mackenzie King). In this way, the pictorial representation of his family supports his

leadership merit.

Aline Chrétien and her marriage are informative about her husband's identity, although Chrétien does not include a portrayal of her in his autobiography. In a 1994 *Maclean's* article, Aline is constructed as a "Private Lady" who "took a lot on myself, with the kids and the family for him . . . Now that the kids aren't here, I want to be there when he arrives at night, to talk about his day, to do things together" (Fulton 1994: 31). The author's description of Aline involves a traditional gender stereotype of woman as self-sacrificing mother, homemaker, and wife. Aline has assumed sole responsibility for childcare and domestic duties to minimize interferences with her husband's demanding career (see Fulton 1994).

Reflecting on Aline's constructed identity, we can infer Chrétien's role as a traditional "breadwinner". This inference is supported by Chrétien's consideration of his income when mentioning his family. When Chrétien learns about other men leaving politics to spend more time with their families, he expresses an alternative motivation to exit politics. Chrétien writes,

I almost quit myself in 1973, though for slightly different reasons. I had some problems with my health then, and the doctors thought I might have had a heart attack. I had a wife, three small children, a meagre pension, and a house with a mortgage; and **I didn't want to leave my family in financial difficulty if I suddenly died.** I knew what it was like to be poor, so I was very conscious of security. I didn't want my children to experience misery after the comfortable milieu I had given them while a minister. (1985: 78)

He considers his familiar role relating to economic support. He provides another more indirect reference to the role of money to his family contribution. Reflecting on Western Canada's prosperity, he writes,

Some mornings I wake up and say, "I must be crazy to stay in politics when I could earn so much more in the private sector. But my wife reminds me, "We don't need more. We're happy, we have a nice house and a nice cottage, and we can give our children everything they need. (160)

In the 1994 edition, Chrétien repeats his concern about financially providing for his family after leaving politics in 1986. The references to income in mentioning his family suggests Chrétien's role as a "breadwinner".

The gender stereotype is further supported by Chrétien's parental role. The financial and socially constructed privileges of being a white, middle-class, heterosexual, Catholic, French Canadian male allow Chrétien to assume a minimal parent role without accusations of his children's neglect. In contrast, at an all-candidates forum during the 1972 provincial election, Rosemary Brown (1989: 126) faced

hostile questions . . . concerning the hypocritical fear that my children would suffer as a result of my political activities, and accusations about their impending neglect. At first the question made me defensive because I shared those concerns myself. I felt guilty about spending a lot of time away from the children. . . In time it became clear that the Socreds realized they found my Achilles' heel. I was not fooled. I knew that the questioners cared not one whit about my children, but they saw that their questions wounded me and so, smelling blood, they kept tearing away, heckling, questioning, and accusing me every chance they got.

Chrétien's political involvement did not illicit these responses. Thus, his autobiography does not reflect on the impact of his career on his family. Alternatively, his identity assumes privileges that not only allow this parental role, but make it feasible. Specifically, the socio-economic position of whites, French Canadians, Catholics, men, lawyers/politicians (class), and heterosexuals assure privileges which help obtain well-paying jobs and assume the presence of a stereotypical feminine role to accept family and domestic responsibilities.

Chrétien enacts the privileges of his identity in his (although minimal) parental role. In 1972, the Chrétiens adopted a Gwich'in Indian boy, Michel, when Chrétien was Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The adoption was part of the "Sixties Scoop," i.e., the trend of "taking native children from their families, homes and cultures" (Evenson 1998b). Chrétien did not recognize the specific needs of this adopted child and Michel was raised like the other children (Evenson 1998a). This reflects Chrétien's position that "treated the same as whites . . . Canada's Indians would escape the poverty and desperation that kept them from realizing their dreams" (Evenson 1998a: B1). The denial of Michel's "Indian identity" and Chrétien's unquestioned assumptions about power structures may partially explain his son's "deeply troubled life" (B1).

Chrétien's understanding of Michel is challenged by the different narratives that depict their lives. This point can be best illustrated using an example. In *The Deuce*, Butler (1989) considers a comparable example of different cultural narratives' impact on the father-son relationship. The protagonist is a half Vietnamese, half American male born of a Vietnamese prostitute and American soldier. This boy was transported from his drug-addicted mother's impoverished home in Vietnam to live with his attorney father in a affluent community in New Jersey. The boy grapples with his identity struggles, which are embodied in his three names - Vo-Dinh Thanh, Anthony James Hatcher, and The Deuce. He struggles with the Vietnamese and American names and how they do not reflect his sense of "who am I?" The subject prefers the name "The Deuce" to represent the multiplicity of his identity.

When the Chrétiens adopted the Gwich'in Indian boy, they named him Michel posing a similar challenge to narrating or naming his difference. He was denied access to alternative

narratives to help him make sense of "who am I?". The name, Michel, reflects an attempt to fit him into a foreign culture (like "Anthony James Hatcher") denying him access to narratives that could express the meaning of his experiences. Chrétien ignores the importance of naming and the experiences of difference for his son. In contrast, Evenson (1998a) reports on an adopted Native girl who, with the help of her white father, worked through her anger and frustration related to her experiences. She was exposed to First Nations people and their stories, which I think were crucial to her survival of her "identity crisis". Chrétien's oversight seems more blatant and inexcusable given his adamancy about renaming Trans-Canada Airlines to Air Canada to provide a bilingual symbol with which Quebecers and Canadians can identify. Similarly, Chrétien refers to the importance of bilingualism to reconstruct Canadian identity into one that can fight the desire for separation. However, Chrétien does not recognize Michel's need for a unique name and language to reflect his identity.

He emphasizes Michel's sameness to the detriment of his difference. Identity construction should involve both. The emphasis placed on sameness leads to the treatment of Native peoples like other Canadians (without recognizing the different consequences of this treatment) and as a homogenous group with static needs and interests. Chrétien would benefit from a recognition of the diversity within First Nations communities and their difference from "ordinary" people. On the other hand, he could relate their sameness with Quebec which would prompt a recognition of their unique position in Canadian society. Chrétien's treatment of "others" leads to harmful policy assumptions and their inadequate participation in policy-making.

6.4 The Emperor: Chrétien and "Others"

In his life narrative, Chrétien uses "others" (working class people, Natives, intellectuals, Western Canadians, Anglophones, and separatists) to not only reflect his identity, but to show their support for him, which promotes the plot. Specifically, Natives were grateful to him for consulting them, during his tenure as Minister of Indian Affairs. Working class people supported him, because he fought Duplessis and could relate to them. The intellectual readers of his book were thankful to his book's assistance in promoting their understanding of the political process (see Chrétien 1994). English-people liked him, as shown by their support for his continuing attempts to speak English. In addition to supporting the plot, these constructed relationships support Chrétien's presentation as a populist. I will explore his unique treatment of the First Nations people and dismal appeal to women and nonheterosexuals. The discussion exposes the specificity of his populist appeal as well as hints at the implications of his specific identity construction on policy-making.

After Trudeau won the leadership campaign and the 1968 election, Chrétien was "invited" to be the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. He was reluctant to take the position, because during the election he was explicit that he knew nothing about the subject. Trudeau responds to the concern:

Nobody will be able to say that you have any preconceived views of the problems . . . In fact, you represent a similar background. You're from a minority group, you don't speak much English, you've known poverty. You might become a minister who understands the Indians. (Chrétien 1985: 62)

Trudeau's comparison between Chrétien and the Native people implies this similarity may

help his understanding of Native people. The naivete of this comparison seems lost on both of them and leads to grave policy decisions for Chrétien as a minister and later as prime minister. Trudeau's comparison of Chrétien and Native people trivializes the complexity and diversity of First Nations people's experiences. He assumes, and Chrétien does not challenge this assumption, that difference, i.e., being a minority, "poor", and not Anglophone, bestows empathy for "others". This ignores the ways that Chrétien is privileged and possesses "power over" Native people. This oversight is embodied in their quick dismissal about his "preconceived views of the problems". They do not recognize the effect of socialization in a racist, colonialist, sexist and classist society, which allow him to enact his power over this group.

Chrétien portrays his experience: "the department was a fascinating one, and because of its range and authority, I used to refer to myself jokingly as the last emperor in North America" (63). The power dynamics in the relationship between Chrétien and First Nations people cannot be overlooked. His feelings of being an "emperor" ruling over a people and territory is appropriate despite the humour Chrétien implies. Colonialist power relations are exemplified in his depiction of their meetings. He writes:

I used to go to meetings with the Indians and they would give me hell. "White man, you speak with forked tongue, you cheated us, you gave us bad land, you broke the treaties." They would say this time after time, and time after time the press would report that Chrétien got another beating. I was always looking bad; it became an image problem. To correct it, I asked to speak first at these meetings and then I invited the Indians to give me hell. "Sock it to me, you guys," I would say. "Tell me that the white man speaks with a forked tongue or a crooked mouth or whatever, that we stole your land from you, that we didn't respect the treaties. Speak your mind." In that way I tried to defuse the public-relations problem while encouraging the Indians to vent their anger and frustration. They felt better for it and we were able to

move on to practical matters afterwards. (64)

Chrétien's response effectively belittles and thus disempowers Aboriginal claims, while he innocently asserts that he was neutralizing the media's presentations of him. The effects of his diffusion of hostility, which results in less media attention, explains the government's stalling in its responses to Natives claims. In addition, his claim to be populist is seriously challenged when he encourages consultation under such limited terms. He clearly defines the boundaries within which Natives could express themselves, reflecting his "power over" them. He restricts their input on governance and does not construct himself as an "ordinary person" like them. The depiction illustrates Chrétien's possession of power over this group.

Trudeau and Chrétien were concerned about accusations that Native people were victims of unjust discrimination, because this challenges their conception of Canada as a liberal, egalitarian society. He writes,

Trudeau and I had been bothered by the charges that the Indians were the victims of discrimination because they lived on reserves and came under the authority of the Indian Act. They described themselves as second-class citizens, and the reserves looked like ghettos to outsiders. But when we offered in all sincerity to abolish the department, to give the Indians their land to do with as they pleased, and to make them fully equal with other Canadians, they were shocked by the challenge. "If you do that," leaders such as Harold Cardinal said, "you'll assimilate us and we'll disappear as a people." They talked about the threat of cultural "genocide" and admitted they needed affirmative action in their favour. After that, no one could use the old rhetorical exaggerations about the reserves or the special laws because the Indians themselves had chosen to keep them. (63)

Firstly, Chrétien fails to draw a parallel between his threat to abolish the reserve system and the abolition of Quebec as a province. In this sense, he stresses Native people's difference from French Canadians to deny their right to a governing structure connected to Canada, like

Quebec. The Aboriginal leaders are not denying that the system is replete with flaws. The reserve system offers, although very limited, opportunities for Native's self-governance. Abolishing this opportunity would not assist in their goal of obtaining full self-governance. If Chrétien cannot understand Quebec nationalists' attempt to redefine Quebec's relationship to Canada, he probably cannot understand the need to reformulate the relationship of First Nations and the Canadian government. Chrétien advocates treating Native people as different from French Canadians (thus, undeserving of unique status or minority language rights), but also as the same in terms of their status relating to the Charter.

Secondly, the previous quotation illuminates Chrétien's liberal outlook. He assumes that the abolition of Natives's special status will position them on an equal-playing field to reap the rewards of liberalism. He ignores, as he encourages Quebecers to do, historical injustices that prevent the attainment of the "equal" status provided by through the Charter. As such, he dismisses the idea of discrimination. The naivete of this presumption leads to serious and harmful policy decisions for "others" in the Canadian state.

Thirdly, this excerpt illustrates Chrétien frequent reference to Native people as a homogenous group, i.e., "the Indians". Specifically, Chrétien does not identify the diversity of and changing needs of First Nations people. His discussion of First Nations suggests that his perception of their concerns has not changed since the early 1970s. He does not consider the possibility that First Nations leaders' reactions would be different if he offered to abolish the department and reserve system today. Because of this homogenous perception of First Nations, he also ignores the hierarchy constructed within communities by the *Indian Act*, which clearly illustrates discrimination. By dismissing this discrimination, he has ignored

the voices of many Métis women who reflect the Act's deficiencies. For example, according to this Act, a "status Indian" female who did not marry a "status Indian" male lost her claim to residency on reserves. Alternatively, a status "Indian" male who married a non-status female maintained his right to residency. This discrimination existed during Chrétien's term as minister, but his dismissal of Native women's voices allowed the discrimination to continue until 1985. The heterosexism, the hierarchy implied by "status" and other forms of sexism in the Act remain. By implying the homogeneity of First Nations, Chrétien ignores the hierarchy (and oppression) produced by the *Indian Act*.

Chrétien does not argue his candidacy to women and non-heterosexuals. They are the neglected "others" in his narrative. As such, he reduces the size of the communities who support him. Women and non-heterosexuals in the working class, French Canadians, Natives, intellectuals, Western Canadians, and Anglophones may see little reason to support his candidacy. Not only does he not appeal to these groups, he seems to exclude them by his portrayal of politics. Chrétien appeals to the voters as he sees them in 1984. Throughout his autobiography, he is quite suggestive of politics as a men's concern. For example, he refers to his colleagues as "the boys" (196). He also refers to bureaucrats as the "boys" dismissing the increasing female representation within the public service. However, the senior bureaucrats with access to ministers are likely all male during this part of Chrétien's career. Yet, he still denies women's involvement in governance. His most explicit reference to his gender assumptions is his description of politics. He clearly constructs it as a men's game. He writes,

For politics is, in essence, a great **fraternity**. Whatever the party or

jurisdiction of politicians, you all are elected officials, and that gives you a community of interest. When you aren't talking business, you tend to talk about your problems as politicians, your successes and your failures, and the partisan element vanishes. The warmth can do much to thaw the chill of political tensions or the coldness of technical negotiations. (172) [emphasis added]

References to politics as a fraternity suggests the brotherly community of democratic politics.

"Community of interest" seems harmless, until the selectiveness of participants in these institutions is considered. The relative homogeneity of identities (relative to the Canadian population) suggests a possible "imagined community," which is implied by Chrétien's depiction of a "community". Boyle (1997: 2) explains this "community of interest" in his comment that

mainstream liberalism itself is an identity politics - a non-universal particular identity - that does not have to confront its own partiality and its contentious parochialism of language, style, and culture because of its majority position. The norm always imagines itself to have universal status and sees particularism only outside of itself.

Chrétien does not qualify the participants in his community, implying their universality. He further confirms his universal interests by warning about the dangers of particular interests being represented by political parties. Chrétien (1985: 112) writes,

At times I found labour less persistent than business and more emotional in the presentation of its position. But it seems to me that its real handicap was its association with the NDP. Because union leaders can never be seen to be getting too close to the government, they are caught between making an effective and candid case for their members and judging the impact on their ability to deliver votes to the NDP. In my opinion that made them less effective representatives and demonstrated the problem of having a national party as the spokesman for a particular interest group.

His ending statement illustrates a pointing towards particularity, but it also reflects the process of sameness and difference. Throughout his autobiography, he constructs his

similarity to unions and workers. In this instance of demonstrating particularity, he stresses his difference from this group.

The successes and failures discussed in Chrétien's fraternity are surely not about the integration of family life with public life. This dilemma is taken-for-granted by a masculine culture that assumes heterosexuality construction of a stereotypical feminine role to assume these responsibilities. This masculine culture is further produced when he locates their interaction at baseball and football games. For example, Chrétien implies that his parliamentary secretary position was a result of a baseball game. He writes,

I've always joked that Pearson noticed me because of his love of baseball . . . Pearson asked me to pitch a softball game between the politicians and the press. He was our coach and Charles Lynch of Southam News was theirs . . . We won the game, and I think Pearson was so pleased that he made me his parliamentary secretary. (31)

Analyzing the location of Chrétien's conversations with his colleagues provides a more acute sense of the culture and its exclusion of women. For example, in the first chapter, Chrétien writes about a conversation he had with Douglas Harkness in the washroom. The conversation determined his perspective on placing Bomarc missiles on Canadian soil. A women's lack of access to this area determines the exclusion of her perspective. Chrétien unknowingly provides numerous examples of how women are excluded from his political life. He is uncritical of this exclusion, because in 1985, he did not perceive women as part of the populace to which he should appeal. In the 1990s, however, Chrétien had to reinterpret his electorate. He makes a feeble attempt to appeal to women by promising their greater representation in government and their constitutional protection from discrimination as non-heterosexuals.

6.5 Conclusion

The relationship between his autobiographical construction of identity and his politics is affected by liberal ideology. Chrétien interprets his experiences with Duplessis and the separatist movement as well as English Canadians, using liberalism. Liberalism assumes that protected rights and freedoms are sufficient to insure individual's fulfilment. Chrétien's identity construction not only support this claim, it supports the invisibility of the specificity of this claim. He offers Canadians an interpretation of their fate, focusing on the Charter. Chapter five and six provide a glimpse into particularity of liberalism for understanding a groups' experiences. The specificity of this ideology, because of its assumption that individuals are free from oppression by forces other than government, is more explicit in discussions of the policy-making process.

7.0 Policy Implications of Chrétien's Identity Politics

Chrétien's autobiography illuminates the thinking behind his policy decisions. The narratives employed to reflect the meaning of his experiences inform his policy decisions. How he understands his experiences will affect how he understands others' experiences and consequently how he reacts to these experiences as a policy maker. While an experience's interpretation is continually changing, the autobiography provides a glimpse into the narratives that are possibly affecting his current policy decisions. In particular, I examine his liberal democratic perspective's effects on his policies relating to Native people, gays, disabled people and more generally, their participation in the policy making process. Before exploring the effects of Chrétien's identity on his policy decisions, the dynamics of policy-making should be considered.

There is an ongoing debate about the extent of prime ministers' power and policy-making abilities (see Weller 1993). Despite Chrétien's own claim to provide ministers' authority over their department ("PM shies from aboriginal apology" (1998)), he maintains power over the cabinet by his selection of ministers, control over the structure and proceedings of cabinet meetings as well as through the media's focus on the prime minister as leader (Weller 1993). On the other hand, if he ignores the cabinet, he faces losing their confidence and their constituents' support for the party. While Chrétien must acknowledge the concerns of his cabinet, the cabinet tends to succumb to the prime ministers' desires to maintain or improve their cabinet position. Nonetheless, the influence of cabinet should be considered in policy decisions, as cabinet members are in an ideal position to introduce Chrétien to alternative narratives. His cabinet members may be able to reveal the limitations

of liberalism, because of its assumptions. However, such considerations are beyond the scope of this work.

Chrétien's policy relating to Native people is limited by a liberal delusion about equality. In essence, liberalism postulates that individual's equality is based on being treated the same as other citizens. This perspective denies the historical and continuing oppression of First Nations people by the government as well as other forces. Chrétien believes in treating Native people "the same" as others in Canada. He argues that "the road of different status . . . has led to a blind alley of deprivation and frustration" (Evenson 1998a: B1) for Native people. As such, they do not have specific needs or require special treatment. Similarly, he ignores his adopted son's difference and related needs. This denial is expressed by Michel's name and his inaccess to alternative narratives and languages to depict the meaning of his experiences. First Nations people's have formal equality in terms of anti-discrimination rights, but in terms of treaty or land rights, which are protected for some people. Furthermore, their historical mistreatment is overlooked, contributing to further substantive or experiential equality. Nonetheless, these rights define the relationship between governments and citizens, leaving the relationship among citizens unregulated and ripe with injustice.

Liberalism treats discrimination as an individual act. The tendency of "individualizing equality problems makes the oppression of women as a group invisible and makes it difficult for judges to see why they should grant group remedies" (Brodsky and Day 1989: 79). Likewise, the Charter hides the systemic and systematic discrimination of First Nations people by a colonial government. Chrétien's middle-class, white, heterosexual two-

parent family sheltered [redacted] from the experiences of his Native cohort who were dragged from their communities into residential schools where they experienced abuse related to sex, race, language, religion and class. He is consequently unfamiliar with interpretations of these experiences, e.g., "We were denied an ordinary family life. We got to see our parents sometimes, on weekends, and at Christmas and New Year's" (Simons 1998a: A3). Or, "they had grown up in institutions. They didn't know what a family was; what mothers and fathers are supposed to do" (Evenson 1998b: D2).

Chrétien continues to deny this systemic and systematic discrimination, because his liberal perspective denies the possibility of this type of discrimination. During his reign as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, he was confronted by the disastrous effects of residential schools for First Nations people and related "Sixties Scoop" (Evenson 1998a). Because most of the schools were closed before Chrétien became Minister of Indian Affairs and because of his family experiences, he is closely related to the subsequent "scoop" of the Native children from their communities and the closing school into white, middle-class homes. In his autobiography, Chrétien does not narrate this trend or his involvement in this policy. As a policy maker and a father, he was involved in supporting and enacting the "scoop" that dislocated Native children from their communities. Personally acknowledging this mistreatment would challenge his legitimacy as a leader of a liberal, democratic country, policy-maker, and a father. As such, he refuses to deliver a personal apology to First Nations (see "Building Trust with Natives" 1998; "PM shies from aboriginal apology" 1998). An apology by him would not only reflect a more collective response on behalf of Canadian people ("Building Trust with Natives"), but would acknowledge his own responsibility for

First Nations' mistreatment (including his sons') while he was the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

The treatment of First Nations people in these schools violates many of the rights and freedoms that are granted by the Charter. As such, the sincerity of an apology should be that much stronger from a liberal. By focusing on protecting individuals, the oppression of communities within Canada is invisible. Specifically, protected rights ignore how Native people were targeted as a group by the government for colonization, which led to the residential schooling tragedy.

Furthermore, Chrétien does not reflect on the particular rights entrenched by the Charter and their minimal effects on improving Canadians' status. The constitution protects freedom of conscience and religion, thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press; peaceful assembly; and association (Dyke 1993). The Charter also protects legal liberty and some egalitarian rights (Dyke 1993). The Charter does not recognize rights to a minimal standard of living to allow the enactment of these freedoms and rights. Challenges to the government's infringement on Charter rights require access to economic and professional resources that are not easily accessed by many Canadians (see Mossman 1995). Because the Charter only helps those who can afford litigation, it seems to be a tool for the perpetuation of power relations rather than the challenging of these power structures. Chrétien encourages Canadians to imagine themselves as individuals with equal rights under the Charter, denying the inequality structuring their relations to the Charter. His identity's privileges are not exposed. Thus, he does not recognize their impact on his experiences with liberalism, i.e., with Charter rights and passing off as a populist.

Chrétien's privileged construction of identity negates experiences which can reflect on the limits of the Charter. Specifically, he does not consider the Charter's inability to encompass the interconnectedness of experiences. There are sections referring to minority language rights, gender rights, and aboriginal treaty rights. However, how is a disabled, low-income, "status Indian" lesbian protected when her rights are treated as distinct and her experiences separated into specific claims? Her experiences emanate from all these components of identity. How can she separate her legal claims into gender, ethnicity, race, class, sexuality, and dis(ability) components to challenge individual sections of the Charter? The Charter does not recognize the multiplicity of identities, which are highlighted by marginalized identities' power struggles.

In addition, these protected rights structure government-citizen relationships, ignoring the structuring of groups' experience by others. Protection for state encroachment on rights is insufficient for individuals, not to mention groups, to achieve fulfillment or shape their own destiny. Chrétien ignored how others treated his son as different, reflecting a liberal assumption that protected rights are sufficiently liberating for an individual to define their own destiny. A different interpretation of the Conservative's campaign commercial could have supported the needs for protection against discrimination beyond government-citizen relationships. Alternatively, his interpretation invoked the privileges of whiteness, maleness, French Canadian, heterosexuality, and his class.

Chrétien's liberal taint may explain not only his dismissal of the effects of his altered abilities (or perceptions of it) on his life, but also on the lives of others. Liberal principles include the idea that individuals who work hard can achieve success. Because of Charter

rights, they are protected from unjust restrictions on their potential. Chrétien had opportunities in his life narrative to reflect on the effects of perceptions of (dis)ability (without requiring his adoption of this label) on his ambitions. Alternatively, he stifles its discussion, as indicated by response to caricatures emphasizing his distorted mouth and the 1993 Conservatives' campaign commercial (Russo 1998). Robert Russo (1998: A7) affirms the underemphasis placed on Chrétien's difference, as he writes,

He has almost never made public reference to his disability, and the mere mention of them makes those around him nervous. There is nothing to be gained from reminding Canadians that he has lived with these problems, one aide said.

Chrétien "tranquilly" responded to the campaign commercials. In his autobiography, he reported telling his assistants not to worry because he knew the commercials would be retracted. He also resolves that the Conservatives may have inadvertently helped him through their desperate attempt to disparage him. Rather than conclude the need for the protection of citizens beyond the discrimination of governments (as he experienced), Chrétien articulates his identity stifling his difference and supporting the liberal principle that hard work brings success. To Chrétien's benefit, the privileges associated with his other identity components construct a social position in which he can belittle the effects of perceptions of his ability. Chrétien's ability to downplay his experiences of being or being treated as disabled clearly illustrate the interconnectedness of identity components in constructing experiences.

The suppression of this identity component seems to have profound effects on his policies related to disabled people. Under his leadership, the Liberal party has done little to

improve the representation of disabled people within the civil service. Alternatively, he exempted his government from the principles of the *Employment Equity Act* (Katz 1998). In his downplaying of experiences related to disability, he has ignored the 55% unemployment rate for this group and cancelled initiatives (introduced by Mulroney) to integrate disabled Canadians. Although he unproblematically accepted an award for this initiative by the United Nations on behalf of Canada (Katz 1998). His denial of such experiences hinder a deliberation on discrimination as a systematic and systemic process against this group. By ignoring the systemic oppression of a disabled people within the Canadian government, he leaves his government's legitimacy in tact. He also denies the limitations of the Charter for helping others.

In addition to the inherent limitations of the Charter, Chrétien's commitment to protecting individuals from government is weak. After being associated with the government for decades, he seems to be loosening his commitment to Charter rights. Rather than expose the assumptions underlying this liberal document, he seems to loosen his commitment for certain people. This can be observed in his behaviors relating to the 1960s "gay purge," 1970 October crisis, and the 1997 APEC ordeal. This changing commitment is not observable in his autobiography, because it has limits on time and place as well as to content, which would facilitate further investigation of this changing commitment.

During the 1960s, when Chrétien began his governing role, there was a government-sponsored campaign to purge non-heterosexuals from the civil service, under the guise that they were vulnerable to enemy blackmail (Bronskill 1998). He likely knew of this campaign as letters were written to him complaining about the attacks (Bronskill 1998). The

investigation into these incidents identified union members, immigrants, aboriginal protesters, blacks among those targeted by these discriminatory practices (Bronskill 1998). Chrétien's lacking criticism of these measures suggests his weak adherence to protected freedoms and denial of others' experiences. This position is repeated in 1976. He excludes from his life narrative a reflection on the campaign to rid Montreal of gays prior to the Olympic games. According to Simons (1998b), this incident is highly controversial, as it led to Levesque introducing anti-discrimination legislation for homosexuals. The high profile of these attacks increases the meaning of Chrétien's exclusion of these events. He did not deny a similar opportunity to reflect on attacks on his class, race, ethnic group and gender during the October Crisis of 1970. His heterosexuality's privileges allow him to ignore these government-citizen experiences which clearly violate Canadians' rights.

The Liberal's 1993 Red Book promises to entrench anti-discrimination rights for gays, as a result of the changing conceptions of the electorate. However, this commitment has yet to be enacted. Chrétien's reactions to gay rights during his ministerial days and as prime minister suggest not only his meagre support of liberal principles protecting citizens from the state but his waning support for nonheterosexuals. He seems content to leave the government's heterosexism in tact, denying the importance of heterosexual identification for protection under the Charter.

The October crisis was another test to Chrétien as well as Trudeau's adherence to the protection of rights and freedoms from state infringement. The October crisis involved the FLQ, a terrorist group that kidnapped two Quebec ministers (one of whom was killed) in an attempt to overthrow the Quebec Liberal government. Chrétien reviews the dilemma

involved in invoking the *War Measures Act*, concluding that "Trudeau handled the crisis brilliantly" (80). They both compromised their liberal principles to protect Quebecers and the Quebec government from the FLQ. In other words, when there is a threat to the state, individuals' rights and freedoms become casualties. The Charter provides an illusion of protection from government infringement, but in practice, this document is abandoned to protect the government's authority.

His emphasis on the Charter to define French Canadians' identities within the Canadian community places him in opposition to Quebec separatists. Quebec nationalists have fought tirelessly for recognition of their uniqueness, which cannot be accommodated within a liberal framework stressing sameness and individual rights. Alternatively, Chrétien professes that liberalism will protect the "French fact" and interprets requests for special recognition as an attempt to break away from Canada, one step at a time. As prime minister, he is determined to fight this process seemingly by rejecting any demands that lead down that path. After his struggles with constitutional talks in the 1980s, he is convinced that a separatist government will not sign the constitution and thus, there is no need for further discussion on the subject. Quebecers desire for a new relationship with Canada will not be resolved when Chrétien asserts the value of the existing relationship, based on liberal, democratic principles of equality, for protecting the French fact.

His liberal assumptions reinforce existing power structures. Chrétien takes for granted the structures that have allowed his close participation in the Canadian political process. He affirms these privileges by not discussing how his race, gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality have supported his participation in these institutions. Taking these privileges

for granted communicates an assumption (or an "invisible" (Chamber 1997) narrative) that he is a member of communities with legitimate access to power. These are the powers granted by a liberal, democratic institutions which claims popular governance, while the face of this government relates specific identities.

The consequences of his assumed privileges include ignoring the barriers to others' political participation in formal politics and their consequent participation in "behind the scenes" work or informal politics. For example, Rosemary Brown (1989: 102) writes, "I was realistic about the slim possibility of the Canadian people electing an immigrant who was Black and female to Parliament." After an electoral defeat in a Board of Governors campaign at the University of British Columbia, she adds "that experience was all the proof that was needed to confirm my belief in my lack of electability; so I put electoral politics out of my mind and resigned myself to working for political change behind the scenes" (104). She interprets her experience as a reason to focus on "behind the scenes" work instead of electoral politics. This work may include lobbying or working in the public service. Chrétien's understanding (or lack thereof) has led to cutting or withholding funding to the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (see Cobb 1998) and opposing the ruling on pay equity for female civil servants (Taber 1998). He does not recognize narratives expressing the importance of this type of work to "others" and has consequently undermined its value by rejecting the appropriate and equitable funding.

Chrétien is not beyond understanding the narratives of "others". Political activists should maintain their appeals to him, because he is our current prime minister, but recognize the narratives he employs to explain the meaning of experiences. He needs to be either

appealed to using these narratives or introduced to alternative narratives to reinterpret the meaning of experiences. Although I am quite sceptical that he can be convinced to make a radical break with his liberal perspective, because he has certain privileges that protect him from profound experiences that may force a radical reinterpretation of experiences, such as the inability to find a job because of discrimination or violent persecution sanctioned by governments. His identity construction does not seem to be challenged by even the threat of Quebec separation. Alternatively, in narrating his experiences, he relies on liberal principles to communicate meaning which hide the specificity of this ideology for white, middle and upper class, able-bodied, colonial, heterosexual men.

8.0 Conclusion

This study has found much support for the theory of identity proposed in chapter one. The reconstruction of identity in terms of the fate of communities and the importance of naming (i.e., "little guy from Shawinigan") as well as the intersectionality and social constructedness of identity are illustrated by Chrétien. On the other hand, his autobiography is limited in its representation of the dynamics of identity. The text is "polished" for discrepancies, resulting from the work of various reviewers identified at the beginning of his book, which may be informative about the complexity and dynamics of his identity. Furthermore, the book was written over a relatively brief period, which hinders observations about the transformation of identity over time. Yet in chapter eight, when I discuss the implications of his identity on his politics, I assume the relevancy of this identity construction for understanding his current and previous politics, as though there is a lasting impact of this identity construction. Alternatively, chapter eight should be read as suggestions for interpreting the relationship between his identity politics and his policies, not as a conclusion or comprehensive explanation. I believe that Chrétien's response to "who am I?" is different at this moment than at the time of the autobiography's writing, but I do not know the extent of this difference. Thus, we are faced again with the issues raised in chapters one and two. In particular, given the dynamics and complexity of identity, can Chrétien ever really know himself? Does he really understand the complexity of his identity constructed from intersectional components? These questions are central to understanding the relationship of identity to political attitudes and behaviours. Can we every know ourselves to such a depth that our politics can be explained? These questions should be

considered in reading my analysis, as they suggest the possible limits which are present in any work on identity.

Despite these limits, I believe that my theory and methodology have considerable merit. I would suggest this theory and method for other studies of political activists. In particular, I strongly recommend the consideration of politicians with other ideological backgrounds. Specifically, what kind of assumptions about identity does communism imply? Could these assumptions explain its successes and failures? How do these assumptions affect communist leaders' identity politics? While this theory of identity and methodology are not limited to Chrétien as a subject, the analysis of his identity politics has certain implications on the assumptions underlying Canadian liberal democratic institutions.

Chrétien employs various cultural narratives in making sense of his experiences. Analyzing these narratives reveals his identity politics. He does not consider how the privileges of whiteness, heterosexuality, middle-class, French Canadian and masculinity buffer his experiences of being differently abled. As such, he fosters these identity components invisibility, camouflaging their importance and relationship to liberal democratic assumptions. Chambers (1997) discusses whiteness, maleness, heterosexuality, and middle classness as unmarked categories. He deems whiteness as the "perhaps the primary unmarked and so unexamined" (189). Upon analyzing Chrétien's autobiography, I hope that the impossibility of separating whiteness from heterosexuality, masculinity, middle classness, (dis)ability and French Canadian identity is more apparent. The treatment of these "categories" as unmarked and unexamined in Chrétien's life narrative depends on their interconnectedness. Changing one component may have dramatic effects on his identity

construction.

Studying these identities is important because "allowing whiteness [as well as heterosexuality, class, ethnicity, (dis)ability and gender] to remain invisible or unmarked makes it difficult, if not impossible, to develop antiracist and anticlassist forms of white identity" (Newitz and Wray 1997: 169). In other words, not challenging the invisibility of privileged identities prevents a complete challenge to the "isms" that plague Canadian society.

Their invisibility prevents reflection on their connection to liberal democratic principles. Not only will this deny an opportunity to reflect on how liberalism enacts the interests of a particular power-wielding group who becomes the universal agent, it further marginalizes "others" from politics. These privileged or unexamined identities construct a norm on which political agendas are judged. The agency of "others" are constructed as "special interests" and given less political legitimacy, as seen in Chrétien's depiction of the relationship between the NDP and unions. On the other hand, whites, colonialist, heterosexual, bourgeois, able-bodied, Christian males who ignore their privileges have hidden their identity-based politics by such rhetoric as democratic representation, common good, humanism, and the good of "mankind" (Bannerji 1995). Hill (1997) locates white identity politics in the "terrifyingly ordinary." The invisibility of these efforts, according to Chambers (1997), is the ultimate expression of identity politics. If mainstream actors' identities were more thoroughly explored, it "would reveal the actual particularism of their knowledge and political projects" (Bannerji 1995: 20). Their constructed identities tend to hide in "normal" politics with "normal" political agents. Ross Chambers' (1997: 197)

summarizes,

The in(di)visibility of whiteness ensures that white people doing what is in effect their own brand of special-interest politics look like so many individual agents getting on with the business of expression, exploring, negotiating, and even settling their legitimate differences - differences that define them not as white people (a classificatory identity) but as "people".

Those in the mainstream resist identifying themselves as particular, named agents as this would expose the processes through which their privileges are accumulated, i.e., colonialism, classism/capitalism, racism, sexism, heterosexism, and the other "isms" that marginalize people. Maintaining the invisibility of these identities prevents challenges to the representation of Canadians in liberal, democratic institutions. Chrétien's emphasis on his populist image is an attempt to hide his own particularism in favour of a universal image (i.e., populist) with which Canadians can identify. Acknowledging certain Canadians and not others in his populist appeal results in a selection of people with legitimate and represented political interests, which perpetuates the marginalization of others.

The influence of liberalism on Chrétien's construction of identity is most obvious in his employment of the Charter to imagine a community - Canada. The Canadian constitution, which embodies the Charter, focuses on individual rights. It does include "group rights" such as minority language rights, gender rights, and aboriginal treaty rights, but the overall focus is on individuals' rights and freedoms. Liberalism focuses on individual fulfilment and political agency. Chambers (1997) explains how this focus on the individuals is key to whiteness's "in(di)visibility" and power. He explains,

nonwhites are perceived first and foremost as a function of their group belongingness, that is, as black, or Latino or Asian (and then as individuals), [and] whites are perceived first as individual people (and secondarily, if at all,

as whites). Their essential identity is thus their individual self-identity, to which whiteness as such is a secondary, and so a negligible, factor. (192)

Individualizing experiences ignores the systematic oppression of one group by another. This leads to ignoring the experiences of First Nations people with the residential schooling system and "Sixties Scoop", the "gay purge", as well as the exclusion of "others" from liberal, democratic institutions. Such experiences challenge the Charter as a mechanism for imagining the Canadian community and the government's legitimacy.

Chrétien's identity construction is both similar and dissimilar from those that are governing in our Parliaments and legislatures. There exists a similar lack of reflection on the privileges accorded to whiteness, heterosexuality, masculinity, French and English Canadians, able-bodied people and upper classes, but the presence of people like Rosemary Brown and Svend Robinson who challenge the norm offers possibilities for disrupting the assumptions underlying liberal, democratic institutions in Canada. Along with this disruption, perhaps noninstitutional politics, such as lobbying or changing family relations, will increase in visibility and legitimacy. The realm of the political must extend beyond institutions to recognize the power relations that structures everyday experiences and their meaning. Extending this realm will expose the power relations structuring our relationship to these liberal democratic institutions as well as to each other.

ENDNOTES

1. Definitions of identity politics differ in the extent to which they conceptualize the interaction of identity and politics. For example, Caraway (1991: 111) comments that "identity politics views questions of subjectivity and identity as the precondition for any oppositional praxis of resistance to oppression." She similarly incorporates the importance of subjectivity, i.e., "who am I?", to transformative politics. However, unlike my definition, she restricts her definition to challenging oppression, whereas I incorporate the maintenance and perpetuation of existing power structures as an identity-based political project. She also minimizes the extent to which identity and politics interact in their construction, unlike my definition which is based on Tessman's (1995) conception. Caraway's definition tend to perpetuate the invisibility of identity politics among mainstream political agents and limit the dynamic nature of identity. Many other definitions of identity politics follow this example (see Boyle 1997; Gitlin 1993).

2. There are many theories of human development which relate to identity construction, e.g., Freud, Erikson, Jung, Buhler, and Levinson (see Zimbardo 1992). Despite the many attempts to reformulate these theories of development as lifelong processes tied to social context (e.g., Erikson 1968), these theories have serious limitations related to generalizability. They tend to be specific to a culture, gender, class, sexuality, (dis)ability and race (Zimbardo 1992). These are urgent concerns, because identity politics embraces these diversities. As such, a new formulation of identity construction is needed to examine identity politics.

3. Choice of communities with which to identify is affected by how others perceive you, not to mention how you see yourself. To ignore this reality entirely would be to deny the effects of racism, sexism, and other "ism" imposed on certain groups by those with power to define. On the other hand, individuals may choose to identify with groups for other reasons. Another reason to identify with groups relates specifically to our democratic society. Papanek (1994: 43) observes that "numbers become an aspect of power." Knoke's (1986) discussion of membership in associations and interest groups can be applied to group or community identification. In group identification, there is a weighing of benefits and costs of association (Knoke 1986). Specifically, "individual decision-making is a cost-benefit calculus weighing the values of selective private-good incentives against the public goods produced by an association" (6). Identification with groups may be a strategic move to seek the legitimation of experiences and obtain power.

4. The inclusion of "(dis)ability" as an identity component is an effort to incorporate bodily experiences of identity into the conception of identity. These bodily experiences change with social context and across the lifespan as we change in our experiences of body and abilities. In addition, acknowledging the diversity of abilities adds to the recognition of identity in terms of diversity. Furthermore, I chosen to include (dis)ability, because the research subject has particularly interesting experiences of body-related identity. His (dis)ability provides an opportunity to reflect on this identity component.

5. This construction is derivative of Bannerji's (1995) description of the *intersectionality* of identities, which reads "My gender, "race" and class are not separated persona or persons - they make and re-present all of me in and to the world that I live in. I am - *always and at once* - there all together for whatever that is worth" (12). The components of identity cannot be discussed separately, because their socially constructed meaning are presented in and amalgamated in responses to "who am I?".

6. On the other hand, Brown (1986), like many other theorists on group relations, depicts group interaction by highlighting one component of identity to explain experiences. He recounts an example of a medical student who was refused housing. He concludes that the refusal was a result of race. He does not consider other discursive community's possibilities for constructing the meaning of the refusal. How were clues about his (dis)ability, sexuality, and class interpreted in the choice to refuse housing? A simple reference to race seems insufficient to depict the landlord's decision, as clues about other identity components were also available. The landlord may have made a different choice for a woman who was able-bodied, heterosexual, middle-class, nonwhite and from the same ethnic group.

7. As Newitz and Wray (1997) deconstruct "white trash," they identify its relationship to race, class, culture, and sexuality, reflecting on its utility to represent their experiences. They also review the politically empowering meaning of this label. For some, it is a "potent symbolic gesture of defiance, a refusal of the shame and invisibility that come with being poor" (170). In this sense, "white trash" is similar to "queer." It challenges the ability to degrade others using that label. Adopting the name signifies resistance - the name is reclaimed to depict who am I and my experience. Gamson (1995) and Newitz and Wray (1997) also review the in-group politics involved in adopting names. To some group members, the label may simply "smack of self-loathing" (Newitz and Wray 1997: 170). Gamson (1995) writes that it is younger people who are apt to use the label "queer" with older people rejecting it, because they associate it with the violence that they experienced as youths. Taking on these labels involves assuming a victimized identity and giving it new meaning so that it becomes empowering. Sometimes "to name oneself "victim" is an articulation of strength, for to give a name to the injustices that continue to oppress is to adamantly refuse victim status" (Siegel 1997: 76). To conclude, "there is no solid ground upon which we can construct a critical politics. All we have to work on is our lived experience which we know to be constructed and mediated through language embedded in power relations" (Kaufman and Martin 1994: 101).

8. This representation could lead to an identification with this space, specifically this place called a constituency, as a basis for identity (as illustrated by provincial identities). Indeed, Harvey (1990) and Anderson (1991) discuss the identification with space as a trend in identity formation.

9. Her discussion of ethnicity is tied to race, as she relates to her vernacular in constructing identity.

10. The idea for this narrative, according to Chrétien, developed after an interview with Ron Graham who was writing a book on Canadian politics. He writes in the Preface that he would only write a book if it appeared in both English and French. The English version is a translation, edited by Ron Graham, of the French version.

11. He discusses his language abilities and disability in this excerpt, suggesting a connection between the two. In chapter one, he describes his mothers efforts to ensure he turned out, implying "despite his disability". On the same page, he also mentions his difficulty with English. Chrétien may be unconsciously associating his disability to his language difficulties. Myrna Gopnick, a linguistic professor, affirms a connection. Russo (1998: A7) writes that "she is almost certain that the prime minister also suffers from dyslalia, a genetic flaw that is probably responsible for the mangled syntax that has made him a target of critics and comedians."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambrose, Stephen (1994) Nixon and his Memoirs. In *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory*. Ed. G. Egerton. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
- Anderson, Benedict (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Andrews, Williams (1988) Dialogue in Antebellum Afro-American Autobiography. In *Studies in Autobiography*. Ed. James Olney. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Anner, John (1996) Introduction to Beyond Identity Politics: Emerging Social Justice Movements in Communities of Color. In *Beyond Identity Politics: Emerging Social Justice Movements in Communities of Color*. Ed. John Anner. Boston: South End Press.
- Antonio, Robert J. (1991) Postmodern Storytelling Versus Pragmatic Truth-Seeking: The Discursive Bases of Social Theory. *Sociological Theory* 9: 154-163.
- Aronowitz, Stanley (1992) *The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements*. New York: Routledge.
- A word to Canada's Indians. (1998) *The Gazette* (Montreal), January 11: A10.
- Bannerji, Himani (1995) *Thinking Through: Essays on Feminism, Marxism, and Anti-Racism*. Toronto: Women's Press.
- Barros, Carolyn A. (1998) *Autobiography: Narrative of Transformation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Bokszanski, Zbigniew (1995) Identity of Social Actor and Social Change. *Polish Sociological Review* 112: 349-360.
- Bothwell, Robert (1994) 'Let Us Now Praise Famous Men': Political Memoirs and Biography. In *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory*. Ed. G. Egerton. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
- Bouchard, Lucien (1992) *À visage découvert*. Québec: Boréal.
- Boyle, James (1997) *Universalism, Justice and Identity Politics: From Political Correctness to Constitutional Law*. Available:
www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/identity.htm.
 (June 17, 1998)

Braungart, Richard and Margaret M. Braungart (1986) Life-Course and Generational Politics. *Annual Review of Sociology* 12: 205-231.

Brodsky, Gwen and Shelagh Day (1989) *Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?* Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women.

Bronskill, Jim (1998) Inquiry, apology called for in Canada's gay purge of 1960s. *The Gazette* (Montreal), April 15: A8.

Brown, Rosemary (1989) *Being Brown: A Very Public Life*. Toronto: Random House.

Brown, Roger (1986) *Social Psychology*. Second Edition. New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc.

Bruggemeier, F.J. (1986) Sounds of Silents: History, Narrative, and Life-Recollections. *Poetics* 15: 5-24.

Bruner, Jerome (1997) Life as Narrative. *Social Research* 54: 11-32.

Building trust with natives. (1998) *The Spectator* (Hamilton), January 13: A8.

Butler, Judith (1990) *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge.

Butler, Robert Olen (1989) *The Deuce: A Novel* New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Campbell, Kim (1996) *Time and Chance: The Political Memoirs of Canada's First Woman Prime Minister*. Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited.

Caraway, Nancie E. (1991) The Challenge of Feminist Identity Politics: Working on Racism. *Frontiers* 12: 109-129.

Chrétien, Jean (1994) *Dans la fosse aux lions*. Canada: Les Editions de L'Homme.

Chrétien, Jean (1985) *Straight From the Heart*. Toronto: Key Porter Books.

Chambers, Ross (1997) The Unexamined. In *Whiteness: A Critical Reader*. Ed. Mike Hill. New York: New York University Press.

Cobb, Chris (1998) Top feminist group says government is starving it. *Ottawa Citizen*, November 26: A5.

- Cortazzi, Martin (1993) *Narrative Analysis*. London: The Falmer Press.
- Couser, G. Thomas (1995) Authority. *Auto/Biography Studies* 10: 34-49.
- Danahay, Martin A. (1993) *A Community of One: Masculine Autobiography and Autonomy in the Nineteenth Century Britain*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- De Munck, Victor C. (1992) The Fallacy of the Misplaced Self: Gender Relations and the Construction of Multiple Selves among Sri Lankan Muslims. *Ethos* 20: 167-190.
- Dickinson, John and Brian Young (1993) *A Short History of Quebec*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitmann.
- Digester, Peter (1995) *Our Politics, Our Selves: Liberalism, Identity, and Harm*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dyck, Rand (1993) *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches*. Scarborough: Nelson Canada.
- Eakin, P.J. (1988) Narrative and Chronology as Structures of Reference. In *Studies in Autobiography*. Ed. James Olney. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Egerton, George (1994) The politics of Memory: Form and Function in the History of Political Memoir from Antiquity to Modernity. In *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory*. Ed. G. Egerton. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
- Erikson, Erik H. (1968) *Identity : Youth and Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.
- Evenson, Brad (1998a) The native son. *The Gazette* (Montreal), April 18: B1.
- Evenson, Brad (1998b) Lost children of the 'Sixties Scoop'. *The Spectator* (Hamilton), April 18: D2.
- Fulton, E. Kaye (1994) A Very Private Lady. *Maclean's*, April 18: 28-32.
- Gamson, Joshua (1995) Must-Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma. *Social Problems* 42: 390-407.
- Garvey, John and Noel Ignatiev. (1997) Toward a New Abolitionism: A *Race Traitor* Manifesto. In *Whiteness: A Critical Reader*. Ed. Mike Hill. New York: New York University Press.

- Gergen, Kenneth J. (1995) *Social Construction and the Transformation of Identity Politics*. Available: www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/kgergen/text8.html (June 17, 1998).
- Giroux, Henry A. (1993) Living Dangerously: identity politics and the new cultural racism: towards a critical pedagogy of representation. *Cultural Studies* 7: 1-27.
- Gitlin, Todd (1993) The Rise of "Identity Politics": An Examination and a Critique. *Dissent* 40: 172-177.
- Goldstein, Jonah and Jeremy Rayner (1994) The Politics of Identity in Late Modern Society. *Theory and Society* 23, 367-384.
- Grosz, Elizabeth (1994) Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essentialism. in *The Essential Difference*. Ed. N. Schor and E. Weed. Boston: Indiana University Press.
- Guess, Carol (1997) Deconstructing Me: On Being (Out) in the Academy. In *Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism*. Ed. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gusdorf, George (1980) Conditions and Limits of Autobiography. In *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical*. Ed. James Olney. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Handler, Richard (1988) *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Harrison, Trevor, Bill Johnston, and Harvey Krahn (1996) Special Interests and/or New Right Economics? The Ideological Bases of Reform Party Support in Alberta in the 1993 Federal Election. *Canadian Annual Review of Sociology and Anthropology*: 33: 159-179.
- Harvey, David (1990) *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
- Harvey, Louis-Georges (1995) The First Distinct Society: French Canada, America, and the Constitution of 1791. In *Canada's Origin: Liberal, Tory, or Republican*. Ed. Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Helie-Lucas, Marie-Aimee (1994) The Preferential Symbol for Islamic Identity: Women in Muslim Personal Laws. In *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Ed. Valentine Moghadam. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Hill, Mike (1997) Introduction: Vipers in Shangri-la Whiteness, Writing, and Other

Ordinary Terrors. In *Whiteness: A Critical Reader*. Ed. Mike Hill. New York: New York University Press.

Hoover, Kenneth (1997) *The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key*. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.

Howard, Judith and Davis Patterson (1984) *Collective Idealities and Social Activism: Creating a Gay Agenda*. Seattle: American Sociological Association Paper.

Ilter, Tugrul, et al. (1994) The Unassimilable Otherness of the "Post" of Postmodern and the Radicality of Radical Sociology. *Critical Sociology* 20: 51-80.

Israel, Milton. (1994) Indian Nationalist Voices: Autobiography and the Process of Return. In *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory*. Ed. G. Egerton. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.

Jackman, R. Mary, and Robert N. Jackman (1983) *Class Awareness in the United States*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Katz, Michael (1998) All talk, no jobs for disabled. *The Gazette* (Montreal), April 6: B3.

Kaufman, Cynthia and JoAnn Martin (1994) The Chasm of the Political in Postmodern Theory. *Rethinking Marxism* 7, 86-102.

Kaufman, Debra Renee (1994) Paradoxical Politics: Gender Politics Among Newly Orthodox Jewish Women in the United States. In *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Ed. Valentine Moghadam. Colorado: Westview Press.

Kimmel, Michael S. (1993) Sexual Balkanization: Gender and Sexuality as the new Ethnicities. *Social Research* 60: 571-587.

Knoke, David (1986) Associations and Interest Groups. *Annual Review of Sociology* 12: 1-21.

Kumar, Krishan (1995) *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Lau, Richard R. (1989) Industrial and Contextual Influences and Group Identification. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 52: 220-231.

Letts, Guy and Angela Aujla (1996) *Identity Politics*. Available: www.peak.sfu.ca/the-peak/96-3/issue9/identity.html. (June 17, 1998).

Linde, Charlotte (1986) Private Stories in Public Discourse: Narrative Analysis in the Social Sciences. *Poetics* 15: 183-202.

Macpherson, C.B. (1962) *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maxwell, Joseph A. (1996) *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*. California: Sage Publications.

McKercher, B.J.C. (1994) Shild of Memory: The Memoirs of the British Foreign Policy-Making Elite 1919-39. In *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory*. Ed. G. Egerton. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.

McLaughlin, Audrey with Rick Archbold (1992) *A Woman's Place: My Life and Politics*. Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross.

Meznaric, Silva (1994) Gender as an Ethno-Marker: Rape, War, and Identity Politics in the Former Yugoslavia. In *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Ed. Valentine Moghadam. Colorado: Westview Press.

Millen, D. (1997) Some Methodological and Epistemological Issues Raised by Doing Feminist Research on Non-Feminist Women. *Sociological Research Online* 2. Available: www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/3/3.html (December 1997).

Moghadam, Valentine (1994) Introduction. *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Ed. Valentine Moghadam. Colorado: Westview Press.

Mossman, Mary Jane (1995) The Paradox of Feminist Engagement with Law. In *Feminist Issues: Race, Class, and Sexuality*. Ed. Nancy Mandell. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada.

Munro, John A. (1994) Trials and Tribulations: The Making of the Diefenbaker and Pearson Memoirs. In *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory*. Ed. G. Egerton. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.

Newitz, Annalee and Matthew Wray (1997) What Is "White Trash"? Stereotypes and Economic Conditions of Poor Whites in the United States. In *Whiteness: A Critical Reader*. Ed. Mike Hill. New York: New York University Press.

Ochberg, Richard L. (1994) Life Stories and Storied Lives. In *Exploring Identity and Gender: The Narrative Study of Lives* Ed. Amia Lieblich and Ruthellen Josselson.

Volume 2: 113-144.

Olshen, Barry N. (1995) Subject, Persona, and Self in the Theory of Autobiography. *Auto/Biography Studies* 10: 5-16.

Personal Narratives Group (1989) *Interpreting Women's Lives: Feminist Theory and Personal Narratives*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Papanek, Hanna (1994) The Ideal Woman and the Ideal Society: Control and Autonomy in the Construction of Identity. In *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Ed. Valentine Moghadam. Colorado: Westview Press.

Perkins, Jerry (1986) Political Ambition Among Black and White Women: An Intragender Test of the Socialization Model. *Women and Politics* 6, 27-40.

Perreault, Jeanne (1995) *Writing Selves: Contemporary Feminist Autography* Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Phelan, Shane (1993) (Be)Coming Out: Lesbian Identity and Politics. *Signs* 18: 765-790.

Phelan, Shane (1989) *Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of Community*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Philp, Mark (1990) Michel Foucault. in *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. Ed. Quentin Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PM shies from aboriginal apology. (1998) *The Vancouver Sun*, January 10: A5.

Polkinghorne, Donald E. (1988) *Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Radwanski, George (1978) *Trudeau*. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada.

Reed, Jennifer (1997) Roseanne: A "Killer Bitch" for Generation X. In *Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism*. Ed. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Reissman, Catherine Kohler (1993) *Narrative Analysis*. California: Sage Publications.

Rinehart, Sue T. (1992) *Gender Consciousness and Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Rosenthal, Gabriele (1997) National Identity or Multicultural Autobiography: Theoretical

Concepts of Biographical Constitution Grounded in Case Reconstruction. in *The Narrative Study of Lives*. Volume 5. California: Sage Publications.

Russo, Robert (1998) Fitting recipient: PM to accept award for Canada's efforts for disabled. *The Gazette* (Montreal), March 2: A7.

Shorten-Gooden, Kumea and Chanell Washington (1996) Young, Black, and Female: The Challenge of Weaving an Identity. *Journal of Adolescence* 19: 465-475.

Siegel, Deborah L. (1997) Reading between the Waves: Feminist Historiography in a "Postfeminist" Moment. In *Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism*. Ed. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Simons, Paula (1998a) Natives' deal angers woman: Association leader charges betrayal national chief. *Calgary Herald*, March 9: A3

Simons, Paula (1998b) Long, rocky road to a rights ruling. *The Edmonton Journal*, April 11: F1.

Smith, Sidonie (1995) Performativity, Autobiographical Practice, Resistance. *Auto/Biography Studies* 10: 17-33.

Somers, Margaret (1994) The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach. *Theory and Society* 23 : 605-649.

Somers, Margaret R. and Gloria D. Gibson (1994) Reclaiming the Epistemological "Other": Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity. In *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*. Ed. Craig Calhoun. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Sorisio, Carolyn (1997) A Tale of Two Feminisms: Power and Victimization in Contemporary Feminist Debates. In *Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism*. Ed. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Srebrnik, Henry (1995) Class Ethnicity and Gender Intertwined: Jewish Women and The East London Rent Strikes, 1935-1940. *Women's History in Review* 4: 283-299.

Steinmetz, George (1992) Reflections on the Role of Social Narratives in Working-Class Formation: Narrative Theory in the Social Sciences. *Social Science History* 16: 489-516.

Stent, Angela (1993-1994) Women in the Post-Communist World: The Politics of Identity and Ethnicity. *World Policy Journal* 10: 65-71.

Swindells, Julia (1989) Liberating the Subject? Autobiography and "Women's History" A Reading of *The Diaries of Hannah Cullwick*. In *Interpreting Women's Lives: Feminist Theory and Personal Narratives*. Ed. Personal Narratives Group. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Taber, Jane (1998) Chrétien's problem with women. *The Gazette* (Montreal), September 23: B3.

Taylor, Verta and Nicole C. Raeburn (1995) Identity Politics as High-Risk Activism: Career Consequences for Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Sociologists. *Social Problems* 42: 252-273.

Tessman, Lisa (1995) Beyond Communitarian Unity in the Politics of Identity. *Socialist Review* 24: 55-83.

Thompson, Elizabeth (1998) Chrétien sapping Charest, Bouchard says. *The Gazette* (Montreal), October 25: A1.

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott (1993) *Memoirs*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott (1968) *Federalism and French Canadians*. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada.

Turner John C. et al. (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Vickers, Jill, Pauline Rankin and Christine Appelle (1993) *Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Weller, Patrick (1993) Prime Ministers and Power. In *The Canadian Political Tradition: Basic Readings*. Ed. R.S. Blair and J.T. McLeod. Scarborough: Nelson Canada.

We, the people of Quebec. (1995) *Globe and Mail*, September 7, A1.

Whisman, Vera (1996) *Queer by Choice: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Identity*. New York: Routledge.

Yuval-Davis, Nira (1994) Identity Politics and Women's Ethnicity. In *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Ed. Valentine Moghadam. Colorado: Westview Press.

Zaretsky, Eli (1995) The Birth of Identity Politics in the 1960s: Psychoanalysis and the

Public/Private Division. in *Global Modernities*. Ed. M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson. London: Sage Publications.

Zimbardo, Philip G. (1992) *Psychology and Life*. Thirteenth Edition. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Zurcher, Louis A. (1983) *Social Roles: Conformity, Conflict and Creativity*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

APPENDIX I - Timeline

- 1934 - Chrétien Born
- 1963 - First elected to Parliament until 1986
- 1967 - Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister Pearson
- 1964 - Meeting with Lévesque to consider moving to provincial politics
- 1965 - Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Finance
- 1965 - Federal reelection of Pearson and the Liberals
- 1967 - Minister without Portfolio attached to Ministry of Finance
- 1968 - Minister of National Revenue
- 1968 - Liberal Party leadership convention, Trudeau elected leader
- 1968 - Federal reelection of Liberals with Trudeau as leader
- 1968 - Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development - until 1974
- 1972 - Chrétien's adopted Michel
- 1973 - Almost quit politics for health reasons
- 1974 - Federal reelection of Trudeau and Liberals
- 1974 - President of the Treasury Board - until 1976
- 1976 - Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce - until 1977
- 1976 - Provincial election of Lévesque and Parti Québécois
- 1977 - Considered moving to provincial politics
- 1977 - First French Canadian Minister of Finance - until 1979
- 1978 - Budget-related conflict with Parizeau
- 1979 - Federal election of Clark and Conservatives
- 1979 - Trudeau announced intent to retire, Chrétien explores leadership support
- 1979 - Conservative Government's Budget Defeated and Trudeau withdraws resignation
- 1980 - Federal election of Trudeau and Liberals
- 1980 - Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and Minister of State for Social Development until 1982
- 1980 - Referendum on Separation
- 1980 - Series of ministerial conferences on constitution
- 1981 - Supreme Court decision on unilateral repatriation
- 1981 - Ministerial conference on constitution
- 1981 - Constitutional package passed through House of Commons
- 1982 - British Parliament passed resolution
- 1982 - Queen Elizabeth came to Canada to sign the Constitution
- 1982 - Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources until 1984
- 1984 - Liberal Party leadership Convention, Chrétien defeated
- 1984 - Deputy Prime Minister, Quebec leader, and Secretary of State for External Affairs
- 1984 - Considers leaving politics
- 1984 - Federal election and Chrétien returns
- 1985 - First Edition of autobiography published

- 1986 - Announced leaving politics
- 1990 - Liberal leadership convention, Chrétien elected becoming leader of the Official Opposition
- 1993 - Federal election of Chrétien and Liberals
- 1994 - Second Edition of autobiography published

APPENDIX II - Summary of Autobiography

Preface - book's development - assistance with book - book's purpose - thanks wife and political supporters Avant-Propos - book's development - reactions to book - book's purpose - thanks wife and political supporters	Chapter 1 A Passion for Politics - family of origin - Duplessis - 1965 election - slang, humour, and emotion in speeches - working class - Pearson - Lévesque and Provincial Politics	Chapter 2 Learning the Ropes - House of Commons - Canadian Press - Ministry of Finance - Trudeau - 1968 Liberal leadership campaign
Chapter 3 The Business of Politics - Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development - Public Participation - National Parks - Trudeau - Turner's resignation - October Crisis	Chapter 4 The Politics of Business - Treasury Board - Ministers and Bureaucrats - Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce - Business and Government - Americans - Provincial Politics	Chapter 5 A Balancing Act - Minister of Finance - Budget Conflict with Parizeau - Business and Labour - 1979 election campaign
Chapter 6 Fighting for Canada - Lévesque, Ryan and Provincial Politics - Referendum - French Canadians	Chapter 7 A Promise to the Country - Constitutional talks - Western Canada - Charter - Unilateral Repatriation	Chapter 8 A New Constitution - Court Challenge to Unilateral Repatriation - Ministers Conference - Passage of Constitutional Package and Resolution
Chapter 9 Main Street . . . Bay Street - Leadership Ambitions - Leadership Campaign - Leadership Defeat - Considers Quitting Politics	Epilogue - 1984 Election - Liberal Party - New Challenges to Canada Chapitre 10 Congé - 1984 Election - Exit from Politics - Employment - Mulroney and Canada	Chapitre 11 Le tortueux chemin de Sussex Drive - Leader of Liberal Party and Official Opposition - Mulroney and Charlottetown Accord - Campbell and 1993 Election - Prime Minister of Canada